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Vygotsky's Legacy: Understanding and
Beyond. An introduction
Summary
After a short introduction explaining the organizational and historical background of
this special issue, we present a brief outline of the content of Van der Veer and Voisi-
ner's hook on Vygotsky. Next we will introduce briefly the topics the four commentators
are dealing with in their contribution. Finally, we hrieflv indicate the authors ' rejoinder.
Vygotskij's nalatenschap: begrijpen en gebruiken. Een inleiding
Na een korte introductie waarin de organisatorische en historische achtergrond van dit
themagedeelte geëxpliciteerd wordt, geven we een beknopte s<-hets van de inhoud van het
hoek van Van der Veer en Voisiner over Vygotskij. Vervolgens geven we kort aan welke
de thematieken zijn die in de bijdragen van de auteurs worden aangesneden, en de reac-
tie hierop van de auteurs van het boek.
The background
In december 1991 an important book has been published for those theoreticians,
historians and empirical researchers interested in and committed to Vygotsky
and Vygotskian related topics, René van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner's stout vol-
ume Understanding Vygotsky. A quest far synthesis.
Already one month later, on January 30, 1992, a symposium was held
around this book at the Leiden University organized by the Leiden Center for
Child and Family Studies in cooperation with the Dutch Society of Educational
Psychologists, Section Philosophy and History of Education. Four papers were
presented on that day dealing with specific aspects of Vygotsky's broad field of
interest that are also covered by the book. Wim Wardekker dealt with Vygots-
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ky's view of schooling, Ed Eibers discussed his ideas about play, Paul van
Geert scrutinized Vygotsky's theory of development, and Sacha Bern finally
tried to use Vygotsky's ideas in taking his stand in modern debates on cognitive
psychology and philosophy of mind. At the end René van der Veer and Jaan
Valsiner reacted on the four contributors under the provisionary title 'Vygots-
ky's legacy'. The presence of the second author of the book at the conference,
Jaan Valsiner from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, was made
possible by a PIONEER-grant of the Netherlands' Organization of Scientific
Research to Van Uzendoorn.
After extensive revisions, all contributions are included in this special is-
sue of Comenius.
It is no accident that the first author of this most comprehensive and vol-
uminous contribution to the study of the life and work of Lev Vygotsky, René
van der Veer, domiciles in the Netherlands. The attention paid to the importance
of Vygotsky's ideas and work started in Holland already in the early seventies,
when the late C.F. van Parreren together with J.A.M. Carpay wrote Sovjetpsy-
chologen aan het woord (The words of Sovjet psychologists; 1972). They then
dealt with Vygotsky's thinking from a rather broad perspective, and also paid
attention to the constructive elaboration of his ideas by researchers like Gal'pe-
rin, El'konin, Davydov and Zaporozec (cf. Van Parreren 1985). Their own spe-
cific focus was on educational psychology. They tried to formulate an action
psychological view on learning with stress laid not only on the results of learn-
ing, but especially on the process of learning. They pointed to the largely social
determination of action, to the fact that the quality of pupils' acting can be influ-
enced via the process of education, and to the possibility to influence pupils'
cognitive development by means of an adequate curriculum sequence (Van
Oers 1985; Van der Veer 1988).
In the context of the breakthrough of the Vygotskian cultural-historical
theory in the Netherlands a few years after the book of Van Parreren and Car-
pay, another important book related to Vygotskian thinking was published, the
doctoral dissertation Onderwijswetenschap en marxisme (Educational science
and marxism; 1976) written by J. Vos. What interested him most were the an-
thropological and methodological aspects of Vygotsky's cultural-historical
theory. Anthopologically speaking Vygotsky adheres to an anti-naturalistic
view on mankind. Dealing with methodological aspects, it is his thesis that only
pedagogical and psychological research methods ought to be used that are ob-
ject adequate, that is in agreement with the basic assumption of man as a mean-
ingful acting and historical being (Van Oers 1985, p. 69).
After this first push the interest in Vygotsky and the cultural-historical
theory in general has grown exponentially, especially in educational psycholo-
gy, developmental psychology, early childhood education and the educational
sciences in the Netherlands. Vygotsky has interestingly enough also been com-
pared with the famous Dutch 'first generation' philosopher of education and
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empirical educational researcher Ph.A. Kohnstamm (1875-1951), who was
heavily inspired by the school of Kiilpe and Selz. Both Kohnstamm and Vy-
gotsky share the fundamental belief that education is absolutely necessary for
the cognitive development of the child (cf. Wolters 1976). In the light of this
growing interest in Vygotsky, it is, however, surprising that up t i l l the present
day only one of Vygotsky's articles has been translated into Dutch. It is the one
on play Ed Elbers is refering to in his contribution (see Vygotsky 1982).
It is not going too far at the moment to speak of 'a second generation' of
experts in this area in the Netherlands (Van der Veer 1988, p. 191). However,
the connection between the first and second generation of experts is quite
strong. Van der Veer has published the only monograph in Dutch on Vygotsky,
his doctoral dissertation Cultuur en cognitie. De theorie van Vygot.ikij (Culture
and cognition. The theory of Vygotsky) in 1985 with Van Parreren as one of his
supervisors. Wim Wardekker (this issue) and Bert van Oers worked together
with and were inspired by J. Vos and presently cooperate with J. Carpay at the
Free University of Amsterdam.
Now we have explained the background of this special issue along organi-
zational and historical lines, we turn to Van der Veer and Valsiner's book.
Understanding Vygotsky
The authors commence their book with a short chapter describing Vygotsky's
life and work. They emphasize his Jewish background and provide us with new
insights into the personality of Vygotsky using his personal correspondence.
This chapter is followed by a chapter covering Vygotsky's little known work on
literary criticism and the psychology of art. Together these two chapters form a
concise description and analysis of Vygotsky's thinking before he moved to
Moscow and entered into the academic circles of the time. It is not generally
known that Vygotsky's first interests lay primarily in the area of education and
especially the education of handicapped children. Van der Veer and Valsiner
provide a detailed overview of this work showing how Vygotsky's early ideas
were deeply rooted in the psychology, defectology, and educational theory of
the time.
The next chapter on psychoanalysis is something of a detour. The authors
discuss the development, flowering, and demise of psychoanalytic theorizing in
the Soviet Union of the beginning of the century. In so doing they provide the
reader with a deep insight into the fundamental role psychoanalytic theory play-
ed for Luria and - to a much lesser extent - Vygotsky. Vygotsky's entrance into
psychology was made possible by Kornilov, his superior at the Institute of Ex-
perimental Psychology in Moscow and an elaborate discussion of Kornilov's
thinking enables the reader to grasp the way Kornilov facilitated Vygotsky's en-
trance into academia. A thorough acquaintance with the theories of his Soviet
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contemporaries as well as psychological thinking at large enabled Vygotsky to
write his oftentimes discussed but little known essay on the crisis in psycholo-
gy. Again the authors demonstrate that Vygotsky's profound analysis of the bi-
furcation in psychological theorizing was based upon a thorough knowledge of
contemporary - continental - psychological, educational, and philosophical
thinking.
No doubt 'Gestalt' theory played the most fundamental part in Vygots-
ky's attempts to develop his own system of thinking. Gestalt thinkers such as
Koffka, Köhler, and Wertheimer, were the major theoretical thinkers of the time
and Gestalt theory was a theory that lay claim at explaining all major problems
of the science. Small wonder then that Vygotsky tried to find his own position
by analizing, criticizing, and opposing Gestalt ideas. Van der Veer's and Valsi-
ner's chapter on Gestalt theory provides us with a unique insight into Vygots-
ky's personal contacts with major Gestalt theorists and shows once again the
imbeddedness of his thinking. While Vygotsky was much influenced by the
theories so far mentioned it is quite clear that towards the late nineteentwenties
he developed his own blend of theoretical ideas, the so-called cultural-historical
theory.
In the longest chapter of the book the authors discuss the major ideas of
this theory paying attention to both its strong points and its weak spots. They
show how this theory naturally led to the cross-cultural research Luria under-
took in Central Asia, an investigation that brought Vygotsky and his group into
conflict with the Soviet ideological gate-keepers and authorities. It was in this
period that leading ideologists launched an attack at Vygotsky and his co-work-
ers, which led them to transfer their research centers to Leningrad and Kharkov.
The final chapter of the book- gives us some insight into the ideological
climate of the time and the ostracizing techniques the authorities used. In fact,
the authors reveal that Vygotsky's name was smeared until several years after
his death. Before his death, however, Vygotsky hoped to avoid major conflicts
by moving his research to Leningrad and Kharkov and several of the final chap-
ters of Understanding Vygotsky discuss Vygotsky's major role in pedology, the
field he moved to at this time. Again, the authors have unearthed a wealth of un-
known material to show Vygotsky's embeddedness and unique features against
the background of contemporary thinking within this field. Finally, Van der
Veer and Valsiner devote attention to Vygotsky's seminal analysis of Descartes'
legacy within psychology and his excursions into psycholinguistic thinking.
They show that his analysis of Descartes is highly interesting, but basically re-
mains an unfinished work, while his psycholinguistic ideas are no less interest-
ing but can lay little claim to originality. Especially the latter fact must come as
a shock to many scholars interested in Vygotsky as his psycholinguistic ideas
belong to the most well-known and cherished ones.
Summarizing, we might say that Van der Veer and Valsiner have made a
major step towards a discussion of Vygotsky's oeuvre as a synthetic whole. The
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subtitle of their book, 'A quest for synthesis' is no less a description of Vygots-
ky's seminal project and his innermost intentions as an apt description of their
own efforts. No doubt the book will need to be amended and extended in the fu-
ture but as it stands it is the most comprehensive and thought provoking book
on Vygotsky and his co-workers now available.
Comments and reply
In his contribution Ethers points to an ambivalence between the themes of the
transmission of culture to children and children's spontaneous construction of
knowledge in Vygotsky's work.
In his opinion most Vygotskian-inspired research has neglected the child-
ren's own contribution to their development focusing nearly exclusive on the
cultural transmission task of adults. Elbers attempts to harmonize the two lines
in Vygotsky's thinking by using his views on play, a topic only briefly dealt
with by Van der Veer and Valsiner in the context of imitation. There need not
be, according to Elbers, an antithesis between the two strands if we study how
children spontaneously and jointly with adults contribute to the reproduction
and change of culture.
Two topics are addressed in Van Geert's stimulating paper. He first gives
a formal clarification of the notion of 'zone of proximal development' by pro-
blematizing the aspect of social assistency or help. In contrast with the sacrosant
position the helper is normally attributed in Vygotskian literature, he states that
sub-optimal and super-optimal help both can lead to a lesser than competence
level.
His second issue deals with linkages between time scales in development.
Based on Vygotsky's view on the interaction of sociogenetic and ontogenetic
time scales, he quite convincingly argues for the study of the dynamic links be-
tween ontogenetic, microgenetic, sociogenetic and phylogenetic time frames.
Wardekker elaborates in his contribution on the thesis that from a Vy-
gotskian perspective the idea of authorship, that is the creative use of existing
cultural potential, is an important aim of education. He contrasts this with Vy-
gotskian interpretations in which almost exclusive emphasis is put on the cultur-
al transmission of knowledge.
The explanation Wardekker offers for this unwanted interpretation of Vy-
gotsky's view on education - knowledge and cultural meanings as given cultur-
al products, as tools instead of cultural perspectives - is the absence in Vygots-
ky's work of a theory of the role of individual authorship in the socio-cultural
production of knowledge.
Bern does not offer an exegesis of Vygotsky's writings, but he uses some
of Vygotsky's concepts to determine his own position in modern discussions on
cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind. In line with Vygotsky (and De-
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wey) he argues against the seperation of behaviour and cognition, and turns
himself against behaviorism and cognitivism. Using the concepts of 'conscious
behaviour', 'development' and 'culture' he tries to sketch an integrative pro-
gram in which action and thought are internally related to each other. Along this
lines, according to Bern, any social and physicalistic reductionism can be avoid-
ed.
In their response Van der Veer and Voisiner show the intellectual pleasure
they have in what they coin as 'the authoritative discourse on developmental
and educational voices' (this issue, p. 423). From their insight that Vygotsky's
work is basically unfinished, and in order to come to a fundamental appreciation
of his significance for the social sciences, they welcome the comments made by
the four authors. They deal with it in a charitable (Bern and Van Geert) or more
critically constructive (Elbers and Wardekker) way.
The current debate should be considered as a contribution to the ongoing
spiral of understanding and application of Vygotsky's ideas in our present cul-
tural-historical situation. Instead of sterile exchanges between monadic and de-
fensive 'schools of thought' we may here enjoy the intellectual challenges of
theory-in-progress.
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Children's contribution to their development
as a theme in Vygotsky's work
Summary
Vygotsky 's writings are characterized by an ambivalence between the theme of the trans-
mission of culture to children and the theme of children's spontaneous construction of
knowledge. Most researchers in the tradition of Vygotsky have focused on the first theme
and neglected children's own contribution to their development. In his lecture on play,
Vygotsky has tried to bring the two themes into harmony. In play, children make discov-
eries about social rules and roles. In doing so, they lay a foundation for further proces-
ses of learning, both with other children and with adults. There is no opposition between
the two themes, if we are prepared to study how children, among themselves and jointly
with adults, contribute to the reproduction and change of the culture.
Wat kinderen zelf bijdragen aan hun ontwikkeling volgens Vygotskij
Er is in Vygotskij's werk een ambivalentie tussen het thema van de cultuuroverdracht
aan kinderen en het thema van de spontane constructie van kennis door kinderen. On-
derzoekers in de traditie van Vygotskij zetten meestal het eerste thema centraal. Dat leidt
tot een onderwaardering van de bijdrage van kinderen aan hun eigen ontwikkeling. In
zijn lezing over spel probeert Vygotskij de twee thema 's met elkaar in harmonie te bren-
gen. In hun spel doen kinderen ontdekkingen over sociale regels en rollen en daarmee
leggen ze de basis voor verdere leerprocessen, in interactie zowel met andere kinderen
als met volwassenen. Er is geen tegenstelling tussen de twee thema 's wanneer we onder-
zoeken hoe kinderen, onderling en samen met volwassenen, bijdragen aan de reproduk-
tie en de verandering van de cultuur.
More than any previous study on Vygotsky, Understanding Vygotsky. A quest
for synthesis (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991) shows the deep ambivalence in
Vygotsky's thinking. On the one hand, Vygotsky saw child development as the
result of the transmission of knowledge from adults to children, but on the other
hand he granted children an active contribution to their own development. He
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never really succeeded in bringing these two themes into harmony. In this pre-
sentation, I shall reflect on this tension in Vygotsky's work.
Although Vygotsky was motivated by a quest for synthesis, the results of
his psychological studies were mostly fragmentary. He was a restless thinker
whose creativity and passionate interest in psychology led him, in his short life,
to many subjects and many areas. His intellectual legacy lacks in cohesiveness
and is uncompleted. One reason for this is that Vygotsky was an inspired speak-
er who, in his lectures, developed many brilliant and innovative thoughts which
he never further developed nor finished. Some of these thoughts have been pre-
served because somebody among the audience kept stenographic notes, which
later were transcribed and published.
If we want to go beyond a historical interest in Vygotsky and profit from
his inspiration in building our own research and theories, the burden is on us to
try and integrate the two unconnected lines of thought in Vygotsky's work.
Many current interpretations of his theory focus on one theme only. They em-
phasize the transmission of knowledge from adults to children, but they neglect
children's own contribution to their development. In doing so, they ignore part
of Vygotsky's writings. Vygotsky's lecture on play, dating from the very end of
his life, brings together in an interesting way the two lines of thought.
First, I shall elaborate on Vygotsky's ambivalence and show the conse-
quences of reading Vygotsky only as a cultural-historical thinker. Next, I shall
deal with Vygotsky's text on play and argue that this text points the way to a
more satisfactory theory of child development.
Vygotsky's ambivalence
The first theme in Vygotsky's work is represented by the theory of sociogene-
sis, in which he connected individual development with cultural historical de-
velopment. A central part in this theory is the idea that the higher psychological
functions are originally social: social relations underlie mental processes such as
thinking, reasoning, remembering and volition. These functions emerge first in
the cooperation of the child with others, and subsequently are internalized as in-
ternal functions. Vygotsky (1930/1978, p. 57) expressed his theory of socioge-
nesis in a 'general genetic law of cultural development'; 'Every function in the
child's cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later,
on the individual level; first, between people (interpsychological), and then insi-
de the child (intrap.sychological).'
In presenting his theory of internali/ation, Vygotsky did not have in mind
a cooperation between equal partners, as Van der Veer and Valsiner point out.
Rather, he envisaged the interaction of children with more experienced mem-
bers of the culture. The internalization process makes available to the child acti-
vities and skills which already exist in the culture: 'The internali/ation of social-
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ly rooted and historically developed activities is the distinguishing feature of
human psychology.' (Vygotsky 1930/1978, p. 57)
Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991, chapter 13) criticize this part of Vy-
gotsky's psychology quite rightly in their discussion of the concept of the Zone
of Proximal Development and Vygotsky's attempts to predict development. If
we view development only as the appropriation of the existing culture by the
child, and if we take adults' role to be the passing on of the cultural experience
to the younger generation, then the possibilities of the younger generation are
confined by the limitations of the existing culture. In that case, a new generation
can never go beyond the possibilities of a former generation. Developing is just
copying what is already available (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p. 343).
However, in order to prevent this unsatisfactory interpretation of Vygots-
ky's theory of sociogenesis, it should be read in the context of an ambiguity in
his writings (for a discussion of this ambiguity, see Davydov & Radzikhovskii
1985; Wertsch 1985; and Eibers, Maier, Hoekstra & Hoogsteder 1992). Vygots-
ky's ambiguity is conspicuously present in his work Foundations of Paedology,
a series of lectures, delivered in 1931 and after, and published in 1935 after Vy-
gotsky's death. I base my account of this text on Van der Veer and Valsiner,
who give a extended summary in chapter 12 of their 1991 book. In this text, Vy-
gotsky begins by explaining the law of sociogenesis and the origin of the higher
mental functions in the child's cooperation with others. In talking about coop-
eration with others, Vygotsky explains that adults represent ideal forms or pos-
sible end products of development. These ideals guide the child's interaction
with others and with the world.
Then, another theme is introduced in the Foundations of Paedology (Van
der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p. 315ff). It emphasizes, not the reproduction of the
existing culture in the child, but the creation of novelty. Vygotsky, in these pas-
sages, reflects on the role of the child's personal history. A child's past expe-
riences, he argues, do not determine development, because, in that case, there
would be no novelty. They guide the child's actions and the child's construction
of what Vygotsky calls the 'new present' (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p.
310). Vygotsky emphasizes that the environment has no direct influence on the
child. The working of the environment, both the social and the physical, is me-
diated through the child's signification, or, as we would say nowadays, his or
her definition or perception of the environment. It is 'the personally meaningful
experience' of the environment which guides the process of development of a
child (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p. 317).
Vygotsky writes: 'The environment has one or another influence on the
child's development that differs at different ages, because the child himself
changes and his relationship to the given situation changes as well. The environ-
ment has that influence ... through the experiences of the child, i.e., depending
upon how the child has worked out in himself the internal relationship towards
the ... environment. The environment defines one or another development de-
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pending upon the level of meaningfulness ... that the child has assembled for the
given environment.' (quoted by Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p. 317)
Vygotsky exemplifies these ideas by relating a clinical case. In his clinic,
he had observed three children who lived with an alcoholic mother who neglect-
ed and abused them. Vygotsky describes how these children had developed a
different personality. The oldest child had taken upon herself a responsibility
which was not normal for her age: she cared for the other children, as well as
for the mother when she was drunk. The youngest child, overwhelmed by feel-
ings of helplessness, was a neurotic child, suffering from fears and mostly si-
lent. The third child showed an extremely ambivalent attachment to the mother.
Their ages, their relationships with each other and with the mother occasioned
developments in different directions. Vygotsky comments: 'Each of the three
presents a quite different picture of disturbed development, in response to the
very same life situation.' (quoted by Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p. 316)
This means that, in Vygotsky's texts, two lines of thought appear, dealing
with child development in quite different, not to say opposing ways. The first
line is the idea of children's adoption of the existing culture and the transfer of
cultural experience from one generation to the next. The second line treats
children's construction of meaning in their lives, it is the theme of their inter-
pretation of the environment and the creation of novelty.
Concentration on the first line leads easily to neglecting children's own
contribution to their development. Vygotsky's first line of thinking has especial-
ly been adopted by educational psychologists. It is also characteristic of the re-
ception of Vygotsky in the Netherlands (Van Parreren & Carpay 1980), in
which Vygotsky is considered an educational rather than a developmental theo-
rist. The popularity of this limited view on Vygotsky may be the cause of the
conspicuous lack of interest, among Dutch pedagogues and educational psycho-
logists, in the theme of children's signification of their environment, notably, in
Margaret Donaldson's work (1978, cf. Eibers 1988).
An example of the one-sided interpretation of Vygotsky can be found in
Wertsch's empirical studies of internalization. Vygotsky himself did not present
empirical studies of internalization. In recent years, James V. Wertsch took this
task upon himself (a review in Wertsch 1985). In a cross-sectional study, he
analyzed how mothers helped their small children to accomplish a puzzle task.
The different degrees to which children of various ages were dependent on their
mother's assistance was interpreted by Wertsch as a development from 'other
regulation' to 'self regulation' (Wertsch 1979). However, Wertsch did not ana-
lyze what means the children themselves bring into the field for making the step
from an inadequate level of understanding to a more advanced one. In describ-
ing the mother as 'luring' the child into her situation definition, Wertsch sug-
gests that children are passively led into making correct performances. In this
view, understanding is the result of guided performance, instead of the product
of joint efforts by mother and child (for a critique of Wertsch's adult-child inter-
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action research, see Elbers 199la, 1991h; Eibers, Maier, Hoekstra, & Hoogste-
der 1992; Wertsch's latest publications come quite close to the view expressed
by me, cf. Kanner & Wertsch 1991.)
Criticizing Wertsch's study, Elbers et al. (1992) observed parent-child dy-
ads collaborating in a task similar to the one used by Wertsch. We observed
children who were very actively involved in these interactions. They took initi-
atives, they questioned the adult's instructions, they sometimes refused to fol-
low the lead of the adult, in short, they participated significantly in the shaping
of the interpersonal level and the solution of the task. We concluded, that the in-
ternali/.ation process does not rest on an 'other regulation', in which the child
passively accepts the mother's situation definition, but on 'joint regulation' of
the task by two active collaborators. Wertsch (1979; 1985), obviously, has been
guided by the cultural transmission theme in Vygotsky, whereas Elbers et al.
(1992) have made an attempt to include the children's contribution to their own
development in the analysis.
In attempting to overcome Vygotsky's ambivalence, 1 want to make two
claims. First, Vygotsky's theory of sociogenesis is not to be read as a theory of
cultural transmission, but as a theory of children's construction of knowledge in
the context of social and cultural relationships. In putting less emphasis on the
cultural transmission theme, the role of adults becomes less dominant and space
has been made to acknowledge the contribution of the children themselves to
their development. The second claim is that the internalization process does not
rest solely on children's interaction with adults, but also on their relationship
with peers. I propose to read all Vygotsky's famous texts about the process of
internalization and about the importance of social interaction, as involving not
merely children's cooperation with adults, but also involving their interaction
with their peers, that is with equals with respect to experience and developmen-
tal stage.
This second claim may be found problematic, because it can be argued,
with Van der Veer and Valsiner's book in hand, that Vygotsky places his expli-
cations of the law of sociogenesis in the context of asymmetric processes of
cooperation between adults and children. However, in one major text, Vygotsky
discusses the contribution of children's social play to development. This text
leads the way to a more balanced view of the two lines of thought: the cultural
historical line and the line of children's construction of novelty.
Vygotsky's theory of play
Vygotsky's article 'Play and its role in the mental development of the child' is
based on a transcription from a stenographic record of a lecture given in 1933
(Vygotsky 1976; 1978; a Dutch translation, edited by Carel van Parreren, ap-
peared in 1982). Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991, p. 345) mention Vygotsky's
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text on play only briefly and read it as an expression of his interest in imitation.
In my opinion, however, its importance goes beyond this, if it is viewed in the
context of Vygotsky's ambivalence and adherence to two lines of thought.
Vygotsky, who restricts himself globally to a discussion of pretend play
and role play, posits play as an intermediary stage between the sensorimotor ac-
tivities of the infant and the thinking and imagination of the adolescent. Infants
are still bound to the immediate situation: they cannot distance themselves from
the stimuli in the environment. They are, in a sense, left to the mercy of the cir-
cumstances. However, as children grow up, they develop means to reflect and
mentally represent the world. Vygotsky characterizes play as 'the first mani-
festation of the child's emancipation from situational constraints' (1933/1978,
p. 99). The endpoint of this process lies in the ability of abstract thought, inner
speech, and imagination, found in the adolescent.
As an intermediary stage, play combines characteristics of the two stages
that it bridges. The function of play, according to Vygotsky, is reflection, but
this reflection does not take the form of thinking or mental imagination, but it
still needs the support of real objects, of familiar actions, and of well-known si-
tuations. For example, children use a piece of wood as a doll, or, in representing
horse riding, they stamp with a foot and use a stick to sit on as on a horse. In
play, children create a situation of meaning in which objects and actions have
lost their normal meaning, but are subordinate to the meaning given to them in
the child's fantasy.
According to Vygotsky's theory, the creative element in play increases as
children grow older. Young children playing father and mother may still copy
their own father's and mother's behavior, but, as children get older, the playful
representation of family life will take a more free and creative form. They will
model their play less on examples than on more general ideas of what parents
are. There is a move from the imitative character of the young child's play,
characterized by Vygotsky as 'memory in action' (1933/1978, p. 103), to the ac-
tive phantasy of the older child and adolescent.
The function of play is reflection. How is this to be understood? Vygotsky
points to a paradox in play. On the one hand, it is free: children can represent
and play anything. On the other hand, an essential characteristic of play is the
adoption of rules, and children's compliance with these rules. A child, playing
mother, must obey the rules of maternal behavior, at least insofar as the child
knows and understands these rules. An important aspect of playing, therefore, is
the reflection on social rules.
Vygotsky refers to James Sully (1896), who observed two sisters (5 and 7
years old) playing at being sisters. Vygotsky comments that, in real life, the
children behave without thinking, but in the play situation, they try to be what
they think sisters should be. They walk hand in hand, they dress and talk in the
same manner, in short, they do their best to create a difference between themsel-
ves and the rest of the world. Sameness is an essential part of sisterhood and it is
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this aspect they reflect on in their play. '... as a result of playing the child comes
to understand that sisters possess a different relationship to each other than to
other people. What passes unnoticed by the child in real life, becomes a rule of
behavior in play.' (1933/1978, p. 95) Here, Vygotsky singles out as an essential
aspect of play that children enact roles and by doing so, learn to understand the
characteristics and implications of these roles.
Apart from learning specific social roles, play also promotes rule learning
in a more general sense. In developing his argument, Vygotsky quotes Piaget's
studies (1932) of children's moral development approvingly. Piaget described a
stage of moral realism in children's construction of morality. In this stage, they
do not distinguish between laws of nature and moral rules. According to Pia-
get's theory, in mutual cooperation children come to understand that moral rules
have a different status from laws of nature. Vygotsky points out that, in situa-
tions of playful interaction with all the conflicts and negotiations involved,
children learn that people, including themselves, have a part in the establish-
ment of moral and social rules. In their play, by negotiating about rules and
deciding to keep to these rules, children learn that social and moral rules are
changeable and that people have to accept them before they are applied.
Thus far, many aspects of Vygotsky's theory of play concur with the
views of modern theorists of children's pretend play (see reviews by Fein 1981;
Rubin, Fein & Vandenburg 1983; and Fein & Kohlberg 1987).
Bruner (1976) and Sutton-Smith (1979), for example, view the creation of
novelty and flexibility as an important function of play. When children create an
imaginary situation, they can discover and explore new combinations and routes
of behavior. These explorations result in a repertoire of behavioral alternatives
children can draw from in future situations in real life.
Bateson (1956) emphasized the meta-communicative learning going on in
pretend play. He did not so much attribute importance to the actual roles child-
ren enact as to the 'deutero-learning'. In their play, children learn about social
roles, not only about particular social roles, but rather about the concept of role
itself. In his studies of children's games, Piaget (1932) argues that children, in
disputes and negotiations, learn that social rules are not natural, but rest on con-
ventions and traditions, and that the contents of these rules can in part be chang-
ed or varied.
Leaning on G.H. Mead (1934), Fein (1984) views play as contributing to
the creation of the child's 'self. Play involves the imitation of a diversity of so-
cial roles. In playing another person, a child appropriates the other's perspective
and makes it part of his or her repertoire. In this manner, the child comes to un-
derstand the variety of perspectives in the social world and becomes aware of
his or her 'self as a unique part in the interactions with others.
These modern perspectives on play are compatible with Vygotsky's view.
However, Vygotsky goes beyond these positions by comparing play with in-
struction and using the concept of Zone of Proximal Development for the char-
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acterization of both play and instruction. This radical point of view is visible in
Vygotsky's famous quotation about the role of play in development: 'In play a
child is always above his average age, above his daily behavior; in play it is as
though he were a head taller than himself. As in the focus of a magnifying glass,
play contains all developmental tendencies in a condensed form; in play it is as
though the child were trying to jump above the level of his normal behaviour...
Play is the source of development and creates the zone of proximal develop-
ment.' (1933/1976, p. 552)
It may come as a surprise that Vygotsky says that children, in play, create
the Zone of Proximal Development. We are accustomed to place an educational
interpretation on this concept. According to Vygotsky's theory of internaliza-
tion, the Zone of Proximal Development is created by parents and teachers.
However, in his text on play, we witness Vygotsky's attempts to broaden the
concept of Zone of Proximal Development, in order to make it suitable for cha-
racterizing children's spontaneous contribution to development.
A first way to understand how children can create their own Zone of
Proximal Development is by realizing that children experiment with social roles
as a means to contribute to their own development. They become aware of their
own and other persons' places in the network of social relationships, not just be-
cause they are taught but by representing these roles in play. This process of
learning social roles and rules does not entail a mere copying of these roles. This
can be illustrated by elaborating on Vygotsky's use of Sully's observation of
two sisters playing at being sisters: in their play, these children make real disco-
veries about what it means to be sisters. Of course, everyday life provides them
also with a lot of opportunities to learn the meaning of sisterhood: for instance,
their parents may tell them not to quarrel 'because you are sisters'. But play
adds to these learning experiences. In play, children can reflect freely on the ro-
les of sisters, they can experiment with these roles, explore their possibilities
and limitations, in short, discover the social implications of the roles of sisters.
In doing so, they transcend their particular experiences as sisters. It is a reflec-
tion, not in abstract thought, but in the form of drama.
The playful adoption of social roles leads to tentative knowledge about
the possible content and function of these roles in real life. This knowledge is
the base for new explorations and experiences in children's everyday life with
others. Play is a preparation for real life. What children can do now in play, they
can do in real life tomorrow. Therefore, Vygotsky says that children, in play,
are more able and more mature than they are in real life.
In an empirical study of children playing school, I have made an attempt
to apply this interpretation of Vygotsky's theory of play and to show how child-
ren's playful representation of the roles of teacher and pupils can be under-
stood as a preparation for their real behavior in the classroom (Elbers, in press).
It is remarkable that, in playing school, these children (between 6 and 9 years-
of-age) are not so much interested in teaching and learning, but in representing
378
Play theory and Vygotsky
violations of the rules and normal practices at school. Their play interactions
can therefore be interpreted as laying the foundation for a peer culture at school,
a culture which is a reaction to the official rules at school. In playing school,
these children experiment with the roles of teacher and pupil and, by doing so,
contribute to creating themselves as a generation (see Elbers, in press).
A second way of understanding why Vygotsky writes that children create
their Zone of Proximal Development is by reflecting on the relationship be-
tween instruction and play. By mentioning play and instruction in one breath,
Vygotsky clarifies what goes on in instruction.
Vygotsky gives play a more privileged place in children's development
than instruction. In instruction, children learn intellectual competencies, but
play is functional in the formation of the whole personality. In play, children
create their motives, their ideals, their social expectations. They anticipate their
future development, not as mere cognitive beings, but as persons. However, by
connecting play and instruction, Vygotsky makes it clear that these activities
share a number of characteristics and support each other.
In the light of Vygotsky's text on play, the Zone of Proximal Develop-
ment in instruction can no longer be interpreted as a merely educational con-
cept. It is not just the creation of the adult in an attempt to help the child in in-
tellectually mastering a task. The Zone of Proximal Development, created in
adult-child-interaction, should rather be interpreted as the product of the joint
activity of the parent and the child (Elbers et al. 1992).
Instruction does not merely involve the transmission of cultural knowled-
ge from adults to children: it asks for a creative contribution by the children.
This point can be clarified by criticizing and re-interpreting Vygotsky's theory
of abstract thinking. According to this theory, there is an opposition between the
spontaneous concepts of children and the concepts they learn at school. In chap-
ter 6 of 'Thinking and Speech' (Vygotsky 1934/1987), Vygotsky describes
children's cultural socialization at school as including the substitution of every-
day concepts by scientific concepts. In its emphasis on the opposition between
spontaneous and scientific concepts, this theory is far from convincing. It has
encouraged educational psychologists to adhere to the idea that the development
of abstract thought is the particular result of children's interaction with adults in
the Zone of Proximal Development. The theory seems to suggest that children,
as a result of these interactions, give up their imperfect spontaneous concepts
and replace them by scientific knowledge.
However, Vygotsky's theory of play sheds a new light on the develop-
ment of abstract th ink ing in children. In his text on play, Vygotsky does not
conceive of the capacity for abstract th ink ing as solely a cultural product that
has to be transmitted to the child and internalized by him or her. It is beyond all
doubt that Vygotsky saw scientific, logical and abstract thinking as cultural pro-
ducts, but, here, he explains that there is another side to the development of
thinking in the child. Play activities, spontaneously initiated by children them-
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selves, are means of reflection: they anticipate abstract forms of reflection. In
this way, children contribute to the development of their thinking, both to its
form and to its content.
Formal education at school, therefore, does not correct spontaneous
knowledge, but builds on it. Teachers make use of children's spontaneously
constructed concepts and ideas. These concepts and ideas have to be broadened
and reorganized, but they have not necessarily to be abandoned. The processes
of learning and instruction rest on the construction of knowledge by the child. If
children cannot freely explore, they cannot meet the demands adults make on
their performance. Children's playful representation of the world is a precondi-
tion for their appropriation of the culture. So, in his text on play, Vygotsky mo-
derates the opposition between children's spontaneous knowledge and the cul-
tural knowledge - an opposition which was still very much present in Thinking
and Speech'.
Conclusion
In his lecture on play, Vygotsky, more than in any of his other texts, succeeds in
bringing into harmony the two themes of his thinking. Vygotsky's view on play
does not just put imitation in the centre (as Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p.
345, mistakenly remark). Play does entail imitation, but it goes beyond it. Play
allows children to spontaneously and uninhibitedly explore the world. The
knowledge and experiences that result from these explorations, are a foundation
and condition for further processes of cultural learning, both with and without
adult guidance.
However, it would be wrong to read Vygotsky's theory as merely ac-
knowledging the function of play for a further appropriation of cultural know-
ledge. Children, in playing, not only prepare themselves for cultural learning,
they also lay the foundation for going beyond the existing culture and, in so
doing, create themselves as a new generation. Culture is not a static phenome-
non, which is passed on from one generation to the next in a fixed way. The cul-
ture is changed, recreated and reconstructed continuously by all its members.
I do not claim to have discovered the true Vygotsky. We learn from Van
der Veer and Valsiner's book that there is no such person as the true Vygotsky.
He was a thinker much too capricious and restlessly creative, inclined to change
and revise his ideas again and again, as to build anything like a system. The
question is rather, toward which aspects of Vygotsky's work we should orient
ourselves. If we, in our own studies of children, want to overcome Vygotsky's
ambivalence, we may follow Vygotsky's example in some of his later publica-
tions, and make attempts to integrate the two lines. The pioneering book by Van
der Veer and Valsiner provides us with valuable means to make progress in this
task.
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Vygotsky's dynamic systems
Summary
Vygotsky's theory still inspires modern researchers in developmental psycholo-
gy. Two themes are further pursued in this paper. First, the concepts of inté-
riorisation and the Zone of Proximal Development are re-interpreted in light of
recent advances in dynamic systems theory. It is shown that a dynamic systems
version of these concepts reveals a far richer spectrum of possible develop-
mental paths than could have been foreseen in the classical version. Second,
Vygotsky's view on interacting time scales (such as socio- and ontogenesis) is
taken as an example of the general princple that self-organizing and self-sustain-
ing dynamics require independent but mutually communicating subsystems. The
communication between such subsystems takes the form of 'narrow ' mecha-
nisms, such as biological reproduction and teaching.
De dynamische systemen van Vygotskij
Vygotskij's theorie inspireert nog steeds het huidige onderzoek in de ontwikke-
lingspsychologie. Twee inspirerende thema's worden in dit artikel kort uitge-
werkt. Om te beginnen worden de concepten 'interiorisatie' en 'zone van proxi-
male ontwikkeling ' geïnterpreteerd in het licht van recente ontwikelingen in de
dynamische systeemtheorie. Aangetoond wordt dat dit een spectrum van moge-
lijke ontwikkelingstrajecten oplevert dat veel breder is dan in de klassieke ver-
sie van de theorie. Ten tweede wordt het concept van interacterende tijdschalen
(zoals socio- en ontogenèse) uitgewerkt als een voorbeeld van het algemene
principe dat zelf-organise rende en zelf-onderhoudende systemen dienen te be-
staan uit onafhankelijke, maar communicerende sub-systemen. De communica-
tie tussen deze systemen vindt plaats in de vorm van 'nauwe' transitiemechanis-
men als biologische reproduktie en onderwijs.
Sleutelwoorden: ontwikkelingspsychologie; systeemtheorie; Sovjetunie.
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Vygotsky's inspiring themes
As researchers working in the field of development psychology we are inspired
by a variety of theories and ideas conceived by the founding fathers of our disci-
pline (unfortunately there are only very few founding mothers). These theories
and ideas form a generic surface, a fertile soil upon which our own little models
grow. I have always very much favoured this 'generic' and inspiring function of
theories and opposed the exegetic approach taking each word and phrase from
the old writings as a biblical message, to be either refuted or verified in a quest
for a - basically rather boring - Popperian falsification.
Without wanting to call myself a Vygotskian (or a Piagetian, or Choms-
kyan, for that matter), Vygotsky's world of ideas has begun to inspire me more
and more as I managed to dig deeper and deeper into his writings, and especially
into the cultural and historical background of his work. The problem with Vy-
gotsky is that his work has been written in a language not accessible to the ma-
jority of European and North American scholars, and so we have to rely on rela-
tively few translations and books about Vygotsky (e.g. Wertsch 1985, and Val-
siner & Van der Veer 1992). While reading these papers and books we look at
them with a completely different reference frame in mind as compared with
their time of writing. So what the writings now mean to us might be different
from what they were intended to mean, but that again fits in with the 'generic'
function.
Here are a number of inspiring themes and ideas that I got out of works by
and about Vygotsky. First of all, of course, is the notion of the Zone of Proximal
Development, and the closely related principle of internalisation. They are core
concepts in that they model the basic transition mechanism in Vygotsky's theo-
ry of development. Another important idea is that of different time-scales and of
related scale dependent mechanisms. Although Vygotsky has never presented a
full-fledged developmental stage theory, a model of developmental paths - rath-
er than stages or states - can be distilled from his writings. It shows the devel-
opmental relationships between thinking, speaking and reflection (conscious-
ness) and the various developmental bifurcations that these aspects undergo.
Vygotsky's career started in linguistics, and this remains very clear in the em-
phasis he kept putting on the language theme. Language evolved out of a tool
system, and it still bears the essential characteristics of the tool function. Final-
ly, there are Vygotsky's ideas on concept formation, and its counter-intuitive
view on the developmental relationship between abstract and concrete concepts.
From these various themes I can only concentrate upon a few, with the mere
purpose not of explaining how Vygotsky understood them but of showing how
they function in my own view on the mechanisms of development. So, any
reader not interested in the private world of the present writer may close the
journal at this point and proceed to a more fruitful activity.
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Major transition mechanisms: Zone of Proximal development and
internalisation
From potential to actual development via help
The classical definition of the Zone of Proximal Development (see fig. 1) defi-
nes it as the distance between the actual development and that developmental
level that can be reached from the latter, given adequate help by more compe-
tent adults or peers. It expresses several thoughts at once: first, that the actual
developmental level is an instable state, continuously changing and drifting to-
wards a state still to be actualized; second, that the change is a function of two
parameters, namely the child's own capacity, and the help given by others. But
why does the help provided by other more competent people turn into a compe-
tence of the subject helped? The answer lies in a major mechanism, namely in-
tériorisation. It is a basic human function, implying that activities carried out at
the social intersubjective level will gradually move onto the intersubjective, per-
sonal level and become part of the person's own competencies.
But the definition of the Zone of Proximal Development immediately poses
a fundamental problem. How much help is the help that gets internalised? It is
not difficult for an experienced painter to 'help' a blind child paint a realistic
functions that have already matured, the
end products of development
zoped ... is the distance between the actual
developmental level as determined by
independent problem solving and the level of
potential development as determined through
problei solving under adult guidance or in
collabo^ yion with more capable peers.
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Figure 1. The classical definition of the Zones of Development
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and colourfull landscape, but will this help be internalised? On the other hand,
we know from the clinical literature that it is possible to give so much help to a
child - help in everything it does or undertakes - that a deplorable state known
as 'learned helplessness' will arise. Everybody who has some teaching practice
knows how difficult it is to judge how much help a child actually needs in order
for him or her to proceed to a higher level of understanding or mastery.
Let us try to get a better grasp on this rather elusive concept of 'help' by
making a number of simplifications. We shall start with an arbitrary developing
growth curve
Figure 2. The growth curve of a developing competence consintx
of a sequence of levels of actual development (Zoad)
competence, such as the ability to solve a certain class of mathematics pro-
blems, a sensorimotor competence such as playing an instrument, and so forth.
Next we assume that the level this competence has reached in a particular child
can be expressed in a quantitative way, such as a score on an absolutely reliable
and valid competence test.' Let us take the child's actual competence level, i.e.
the level at time t. According to the earlier definition, this is the child's Zone of
Actual Development (Zoad). Since we have given ourselves a divine knowledge
of the past, present and future competence curve, we also know the ZOAD at
some later time t+1 (see fig. 2). Taking the definition of the Zone of Proximal
Development (Zoped) again, we know that this later Zoad at time t+1 is the Zo-
ped at time t (actually, we have defined the time difference between t and t+1 in
such a way that it allows for a given Zoped to become a Zoad). By convention,
we project the later Zoad at time t+1 into the current Zoped at time t by drawing
a horizontal line (fig. 3).
We can perform this projection for each point on the time scale, and end
up with a curve that actually parallels the growth curve of the competence itself.
1. We may of course never achieve such a score in practice, since we will always have to face meas-
urement errors; however, for the present thought experiment we may act as if we have access to the
true competence level.
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This second curve is the growth curve of the proximal (or potential) develop-
ment, while the original curve refers to the actual development. Apart from re-
presenting the proximal development, the second curve also represents another
important aspect of the developmental process. According to the definition, the
Zoped turns into a Zoad as a function of help given to the child. This help could
range from actual help and assistance to the child, to a specific structuring and
limiting of the problem enabling the child to avoid pitfalls and difficulties.
It follows then that, from a purely formal point of view, the help given
Zoad at t+1
growth curve
Figure 3. -4 current Zoped (time t) represents a later zone of
actual development (t + I)
and later developmental effect of that help, in a form of a later level of actual
development that this help brings about, are interchangeable. That is, the curve
representing the later Zoad-levels instantiated in the present Zoped levels, is for-
mally similar to the curve representing the level of help given. Put differently,
we can define the level of help as the level of the Zoad that will result out of it
after a given amount of time has elapsed.
The curve representing the growing Zoped must be similar to the curve
representing the optimal help, i.e. the help that turns the Zoped into the Zoad at
time t+1. We don't know what this help is - and it will fully depend on the actu-
al circumstances what this help will really entail - but we know that the second
curve must represent the help, since Zoped and optimal help are equivalent as
far as the transformation into a new Zoad is concerned (see fig. 4). Technically,
what has happened here is that the help variable - which is a multidimen!
variable containing all sorts of help and assistance - is mapped onto a one-di-
mensional variable, namely the variable measuring the effect of the help, i.e. the
variable measuring the competence level. It follows from the definition that the
help, measured as a function of the competence, must always be ahead c
actual developmental level, and this can be clearly seen in the figure (fig. A
Since we express the help given in terms of the competence level to b
reached later, we can ask ourselves what would happen if that help would lay
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help curve
T~ HFT
Figure 4. The growth curve of the help given corresponds with
the growth curve of the Zopeds
below or above the ideal point corresponding with the Zoped. In the first case
the help is too close to the child's actual competence level, and it will bring the
child not very much further from where it presently is, that is, it will not add
anything significant to what the child already knows or masters. In the second
case, the help is too far from the child's actual level, and it will not be under-
stood or assimilated. In both cases, such help will project onto a later competen-
ce level at time t+1 which lies significantly below the level produced by optimal
help. Put differently, the model makes no distinction between help that is too
close and help that is too far from the actual competence level, since the later
developmental consequence of both forms of help is similar, namely a lower le-
vel than could be reached with optimal help (fig. 5).
In summary, the major idea behind the model explained here is that any
type of help actually represents (displays, models,...) a level of competence that
can in principle be achieved by the learner. But if this help is either below or
above some optimal distance from the current competence level, it will result in
a growth of the competence level which is less than could have happened if the
competence-help distance would have been optimal.
This quantitative description of the relationship between a future compe-
tence level, and a current level of help, will be used as the starting point of a
mathematical simulation of the Vygotskian mechanism of development. I shall
not discuss the details of this simulation here, but confine to the major notions
behind it, and show some of the growth curves that the model produces.
The dynamics of Zoped
The basic idea behind the mathematical model is as follows. First, there is a
goal state to be achieved by a learner (e.g. mastery of writing skill). The learner
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Figure 5. Optimal help will have an optimal learning effect;
help above or below that level will project onto a lower
Zoad (at t + 1)
is put in a situation where the learning of the skill is made possible. The lear-
ner's activities represent some point along the line leading from complete lack
to full mastery of the skill (e.g. a child making scribbles). The 'helper' or tutor
is able to provide help in that a joint activity is created that is closer to the goal
state than the child's solitary activity would be. In this sense, the helper is al-
ways a little bit ahead of the learner, in the direction of the goal state. If the help
is optimal, the child will be able to intériorise it, and so reach a higher level, na-
mely the competence level as represented by the current joint activity of helper
and learner. This means that the child is continuously approaching the level in-
stantiated in the help given (see fig. 6).
The whole dynamics in the system is highly reminiscent of the apocryphi-
cal story of the farmer and the donkey. The donkey was unwilling to go home,
so the farmer tied a carrot to a stick and held it in front of the donkey. As the
donkey went forward to reach out for the carrot, it made the carrot move for-
ward too. The story holds that the donkey's fruitless chase continued until the
company reached the farm.
The mathematical simulation of this model is based on two components
and two basic assumptions. The components are the competence level of the
learner on the one hand, and the competence level as instantiated by the help
given, on the other hand. The competence level could refer to anything, like
writing competence, a problem solving skill, and so forth. The model only
deals with the quantitative aspect of the skill or competence growth.
The assumptions are as follows. First, the increase in both the learner's
competence and the helper's level of help given is described by a logistic
growth model. Simply said, the model assumes that cognitive growth is a func-
tion of a growth parameter (speed of growth), the level of competence or skill
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goal state
Figure 6. The learner seeks to approach the level In the help given, the
help stays ahead of the learner's actual competence level
already achieved, and the distance between this level and a goal state. The de-
tails of the model are discussed elsewhere (see Van Geert 1991 and 1992). The
second assumption is that the growth rate (the speed with which the skill or
competence increases over time) of both the learner's competence and the help-
er's help level will depend on an optimum. If there is an optimum distance be-
tween the child's actual competence and the help given, the child will maximal-
ly profit from the help, and proceed faster than if the help is above or below that
optimum. We need not be concerned with how much exactly this optimum is,
since that depends on the actual properties of the learn-and-help-situation. The
optimum not only holds for the learner, but also for the helper. For instance, if
the distance between the actual progress of the child and the help given, as per-
ceived by the helper, is beyond or below a certain optimum, the helper will tend
to stay closer to the learner's actual competence level than if the perceived dis-
tance would be optimal. So the model affords for conflicts between optima that
hold for the learner and optima that hold for the helper. Imagine the case of a
very bright child and a tutor who is used to teach much slower children. The
bright child will profit most from a rather extensive gap between actual compe-
tence and help given. The tutor on the other hand, is used to keeping a much
smaller gap between the learner's competence and the help given, and this will
eventually be to the disadvantage of the bright, fast learner. For instance, assu-
me that the tutor holds to giving detailed and concrete instructions on how to
proceed with a task, forcing the child to stop and check every single step. A
bright child on the other hand might profit much more from a teacher explaining
390
Vygotsky's dynamic systems
general principles of the task. A mentally handicapped child, on the other hand,
will profit more from the first form of instruction, and learn virtually nothing
from abstract rules that are verbally given.
The model of interacting adaptations between a helper and a learner, ba-
sed on the Vygotskyan model of the Zone of Proximal Development, is a so-
called dynamic model, more precisely a non-linear dynamic model. The predica-
te 'dynamic' refers to the fact that the two basic aspects involved, the complexi-
ty or level of the help given, and the competence level achieved by the learner,
continuously influence one another over time. That is, there is no distinction
between a dependent variable, such as the learner, and an independent variable,
the helper (or tutor, or educational environment for that matter). They are mutu-
ally dependent variables. It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict the evo-
lution of the components involved in such a dynamic model if one confines to
qualitative, verbal extrapolating methods. In fact, one hardly knows what such
models do under different parameter values and conditions if one does not run a
simulationt (remember that the parameters involved are, for instance, the opti-
mum distances required tor the fastest adaptation, the learning rate, the rate of
change of the level of help, and so forth). What these simulations usually show
is that the relationship between a parameter and the developmental effect, for
instance the learning curve resulting from the help given, is non-linear. That is,
with linearly increasing parameter values (e.g. increasing optima), the model
wi l l yield qualitatively different growth curves, characterized by threshold
values. What this means can be seen in fig. 7.
The alphabetical order of the diagrams corresponds with an increase in
one parameter involved, namely the optimum distance between current compe-
tence level and help given as defined for the learner. Note that what was meant
by 'optimal distance' in this case is the distance between current level and help
given that allows for the fastest and biggest growth of the competence in the
learner. All other parameters have been kept constant, at a default or 'normal'
value.
Fig. 7a shows what happens if the learner's optimum distance between
current competence and help given is very small (and considerably smaller than
what the helper or tutor would consider optimal): the learner's competence ne-
ver gets off the ground. It may rise somewhat, but then drop back to about zero,
eventually rise and drop again, and so forth. With a higher optimum, we find a
qualitatively different curve of competence growth: it will rise, then drop to
about zero, and then rise again to the goal level. This is the growth form we
would find with competences that after a preliminary stage of expression - at a
low level - disappear and emerge again later, leading to a full mastery of the
competence ( ' ful l ' means something like the maximum level attainable given
the support and individual resources of the learner). With further increasing
learner's optimum a third qualitatively different growth form is observed. In
this case learner and helper get trapped into some sort of dead end. What hap-
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Figure 7. Different growth curves result from a continuous change in the optimal distan-
ce parameter
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pens is that the help level grows beyond the level that the learner would still
profit from, and it is not capable of coming closer to the learner's level in order
to set the learning process in motion again (fig. 7c).
With a higher optimum the learning curve takes the form of an S-shaped
growth pattern with an intermediary plateau, where hardly any progress takes
place (fig. 7d). Further increase in the optimum brings the curve nearer to the
ideal form, namely a rather steep, S-shaped increase leveling off towards a
maximum (fig. 7e). Put differently, for a given optimum of help provided, there
is a learning optimum,2 that results in a maximally fast increase in the compe-
tence at issue. Fig. 7f shows what happens if this optimum is exceeded: a learn-
ing curve emerges which evolves toward a steady state well beneath the actual
achievable level (comparable to what happens with a sub-optimum, like in fig.
7c). Learning and help are caught in a trap, so to speak. What causes the growth
to come to a standstill is the fact that the help level grows to such a distance
from the actual competence level, that it is no longer functioning as help, that is,
the help has no supporting function for the learner anymore. Finally, with still
higher learning optima, (he learner's ini t ia l competence never comes off the
ground, it remains minimal (this situation is not contained in fig. 7).
Two observations are worth mentioning here. First, as the critical parame-
ter1 value increases the qualitative nature of the resulting learning or growth
curves changes, as fig. 7 clearly shows. In the vicinity of these changing points,
the actual outcome is very much dependent on initial state conditions. That is,
the resulting curve could either be of the form typical of lower parameter val-
ues, or of the form typical of the higher value. Which of these two actually
emerges depends on small fluctuations in the starting points. Put differently, in
the vicinity of qualitative switch points the actual outcome is very sensitive to
minor, random influences: small, normally irrelevant differences in starting
point for instance, could lead to major long term differences in the resulting de-
velopmental trajetory. Beyond such switch points, the resulting trajectory is not
sensitive to minor perturbations, and as such, very well predictable (if one
knows the parameter values, that is).
Second, it is basic to note that each of these qualitative growth patterns i
the result of one and the same form of interaction between two parties, one the
learner, the other a helper or tutor. If one is not used to work with these dynamic
models, it is difficult to imagine that there is nothing else but the continuous in-
teraction, under specific parameter values, that causes these qualitatively difie
rent patterns to emerge. For instance, there is no extrinsic factor interfering with
2. Remember that this optimum means the distance between current competence level and that form
of help given that promotes the fastest and biggest learning in the learner
3. The critical parameter here is the learning optimum as it applies to the learner
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the temporary regression in fig. 7b. Because of the way the interaction works
under the given parameter values, both parties involved - learner and helper -
push one another into the regression, and get one another out after the bottom
has been reached. Actually, it is remarkable to see that such qualitatively diffe-
rent patterns are implied in a form of interaction which is so basically simple as
the Vygotskyan model of Proximal Development.
At this point one might ask what all this has got to do with Vygotsky, who
worked on these models at a time computers did not even appear in fairy tales
and who lived in a state and political system that no longer exists at the present
moment. The answer is that we are now capable of investigating aspects of Vy-
gotsky's model that were beyond his means and possibilités at his time. What
the computer simulation of the model reveals is that it is much more complex
and richer than we could have thought of, judging only on the basis of the quali-
tative verbal form into which the model had been cast originally. The computer-
simulated growth curves presented here are of course not empirical curves.
They should be seen as hypotheses that the model generates. If the model is
true, and the present formalization of it is valid, then we should find the variety
of learning curves presented in fig. 7. I shall not discuss the empirical evidence
here. The major lesson to be learnt from the present model-theoretic exercise is
that classical models, such as Vygotsky's are capable of providing a theoretical
explanation for many more different forms of growth and development than the
straightforward linear form we are used to think of. Developmental psychology
has so far not been very strong neither in building formal models, nor in genera-
ting hypotheses based on a formal calculus. Our major style of hypothesis gene-
ration is a form of extrapolation from verbally presented models. But if we do
apply the formal approach, and study the dynamics of simple interaction forms
such as those described in a classical model as Vygotsky's, we hit upon unex-
pected complexities and a rich variation of possible growth forms. The next
step, which I shall not attempt to make here, is to put these formally inferred
trajectories to empirical test.
The dynamics of interacting time scales
Because of the historical time and place Vygotsky lived in, there are many
aspects of his work that clearly reveal a Marxist inspiration. One of them con-
cerns his belief that the individual grows and develops in a specific historical
and biological context. These contexts too are subject to change and develop-
ment, but the laws that govern their change are different in the sense that each
context has its own particular mechanisms. Finally, the contexts of change in-
fluence one another. Historical change sets the context, limitations and possibi-
lities for individual development, while individuals, through their collective la-
bour, determine the course of history on their turn. This is the principle of mu-
tuality of contexts, or more precisely, the mutuality of time scales.
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Figure 8. Gradual increase in physical time corresponds with non-gradual change of operative
Mechanisms, resulting in different natural timescnl<-\
Of course, the idea that there are different time levels or contexts, such as
the biological, cultural and personal time levels, that these levels are having
their own development, and finally that they are interconnected, was far from
new in Vygotsky's days. There were other developmentalists, such as Piaget or
Stanley Hall, who would also pay considerable attention to that aspect. But Vy-
gotsky differs from these two in that on the one hand he saw an explicit mutua-
lity between the time levels - which would distinguish him clearly from Stanley
Hall's conception - while on the other hand he would attribute to each level its
own characteristic mechanism of change, which would distinguish him from
Piaget.
The different time scales are not just taxonomie conventions. They emer-
ge from the way in which particular physical structures and principles of organi-
zation 'cling to time', so to speak (see fig. 8). Take for instance the gait patterns
of quadrupeds. The horse's gait pattern changes abruptly as a specific speed
threshold in locomotion is surpassed. The change is typical of the way in which
the horse's body must maintain that speed, and the way in which this is possible
depends on physical parameters and the mechanics of the moving quadruped
body. In the same spirit, time scales arise because physical structures have limi-
ted life spans. The limitations - which vary broadly but which are nevertheless
real - arise from the particular way in which the structures cope with detenora-
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tion and decay. Take for instance an animal body consisting of a complicated
amalgam of soft and hard tissue. The span over which such a structure can be
maintained is limited, because of the specific environmental perturbations that
never stop attacking it. The structure defines a particular time scale, namely that
of the single individual. On the other hand take the structure of the DNA con-
tained in such a body. Because of its size, physical properties and hiding place
(in the body), its life span (the duration along which it maintains its identity) is
much longer than that of the bodies in which it is kept. DNA defines the time
scale of the biological species.
Let us take a different example, that of the time scales of human cultures,
the participating individuals and their subjective experiences. The idea that the-
re are different time scales whose nature and interaction is of utmost importance
for the explanation of developmental phenomena was salient in Vygotsky's
theory (see Wertsch, 1985; Valsiner and Van der Veer, 1991 ).
Let us go a bit further into a model of developmental time scales inspired
by Vygotsky's views (see fig. 9). The smallest psychologically relevant time
scale is determined by the peculiarities of our nervous systems. The nervous
system accounts for a limited experiential time, taking the form of conscious ex-
periences, short term memories, activities, and so forth. This is the so-called mi-
cro-genetic time scale. What happens at this time scale determines - and is mu-
tually determined by - the events at the time scale of our lives and life span. At
this latter time scale, the ontogenetic scale that is, the events take the form of
developmental and life span changes. In Vygotsky's view (e.g. Vygotsky 1962,
1973) ontogenesis is based on two forms of learning. The first is the natural
form, which is dominant during the early period of life and directly based on
our innate learning and cognitive endowments as a biological species. The se-
cond is the socio-cultural form of learning, based on teaching and symbol use.
This is the form of learning we inherit from our being a socio-cultural species,
i.e. a species with a socio-cultural time scale. Thus we arrive at the third level of
time, that of sociogenesis. It is the level at which cultures and societies maintain
and change their structure and identity. It's natural time scale is bound by the
forms of decay that act upon organisations such as social institutions, symbol
systems, religious beliefs and so forth. The mechanisms that operate on this sca-
le are those of historical development of societies through the collective labour
of their members. Another mechanism is the decontextualisation which emerges
as a consequence of the historical manipulation of man-made symbol systems.
As a biological entity, the human species has its own phylogenetic scale, i.e. the
scale at which it maintains its species identity. According to Vygotsky, phyloge-
netic evolution in primates has created the conditions for the emergence of th«
socio-cultural level. Those conditions are the evolution of the primate body anc
brain, group activity and tool use.
What makes this whole complicated structure moving, changing anc
maintaining its (dynamic) identity are not only the mechanisms that operate 01
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Figure 9. Four major time levels with their characteristic operative mechanisms
each of these levels. The levels would not exist if it were not for the particular
links between them. These linking mechanisms are 'narrow', and vulnerable in
a sense, but being embedded in the whole structure they manage to keep the
whole thing moving. They are narrow in the sense that they constitute only one
of the incredibly many mechanisms and activities that take place at each time
scale (see fig. 10). For instance, the classical biological 'gate' from phylo- to
ontogenesis is sexual gene transmission. Copulation, though, is but one of the
many activities that animals engage in. The gate from onto- to phylogenesis is
selective survival (more precisely selective reproduction), but the death of spe-
cific animals is but a single event in the totality of events that occur with those
animals in general. The same narrowness applies to the mechanisms that link
the other levels. Between the phylo- and sociogenetic level we observe the acti-
vity of gene-culture interaction: the gene pool of the human species allows for
the establishment of certain types of cultures, and not (or much less likely so)
for others. The link between the socio- and the phylogenetic level is made by
culture-gene-interaction: it is the mechanism through which cultural institutions
affect the gene pool and the selective survival of specific genetic types. Both ty-
pes have not been studied extensively, to say the least, so much remains unclear
about how these mechanisms work (but see Lumsden & Wilson 1981; and Boyd
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Figure 10. 'Narrow' mechanisms link the four major time levels and co-determine the
dynamics of the entire time system
& Richerson 1985). The mechanism connecting the socio- with the ontogenetic
level is the mechanism of teaching and its opposite mechanism appropriation. It
is hy teaching new members of society that culture may cope with the problem
that the life span of its members is so much shorter than the time needed for cul-
ture to change, evolve and maintain its own (meta-)identity. Since teaching in
humans involves sign systems - which are material objects - teaching and trans-
mission may take place not only between human individuals but also from sign-
bearing objects such as books to those individuals. The opposite mechanism,
linking the ontogenetic time scale with the sociogenetic one is the mechanism
of productivity, i.e. the individual's contribution to the maintenance and trans-
formation of society. Many of the things that humans produce, such as meals or
clean classrooms last for only a very limited time, but other things last much
longer, such as important scientific concepts or Stalinist buildings. Marxist phi-
losophy in particular has given a great deal of thought to the problem of how the
production of commodities and of the means for such production shaped the
evolution of historical societies and the minds and thoughts of individuals.
In humans there exist also direct links between the phylogenetic and onto-
genetic scales (though mediated by the sociogenetic scale), and these are the
links that exist between all biological organisms and their evolutionary history,
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cultural individuals —biological individuals
Rgure \\.The biological and sociological time scales consist of iterations of individuals. The
^ration function ƒ is different, in terms of mechanisms and numbers of individuals involved
namely the mechanisms of genetic transmission and selective survival and re-
production.
The link from the microgenetic to the ontogenetic level is the mec
of learning: learning is the long-term effect in terms of the built-up c
knowledge of short-term activities. In humans the learning process is a
shaped by teaching, and thus accounts for the transmission of cultural
to individuals, i.e. for the process of appropriation. The reverse r
retrieval, i.e. the possibility to bring past experiences into the present, fc
ce by remembering, or by the effect of practice.
Using the terms of dynamic systems modeling, one could say that
time scale acts as a materialized iterative map (see fig. 11). An iterative
nothing but a process (e.g. sexual reproduction) that operates on s<
(e.g. individuals), produces some product (e.g. offspring), and that i
Plied to the product (i.e the offspring using sexual reproduction to prc
offspring). For instance, on the level of phylogeny, the iteration cons«
transmission of genetic material coding for body form and behavio
duction of individual bodies and their behaviours. Thus each 'iterate
organism, and over the course of many iterations changes occur in th
as well as in the connected body forms. Such changes may be gradi
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the form of punctuations between equilibria. The same principle is true for so-
ciogenesis, where each individual is the bearer of a limited part of the complete
content of a society's knowledge, culture, and skills. An iteration consists of the
creation of a new enculturated individual, and this occurs through teaching and
appropriation. The process is an iteration in the sense that a similar process,
such as biological reproduction, or teaching/learning, is applied to the output of
the previous iteration: the products of a previous biological reproduction pro-
cess (individuals) produce a new individual by applying the biological repro-
duction transformation, or the products of a previous teaching process (e.g. lite-
rate subjects) now engage in teaching new individuals.
Although the mechanisms operating on and between each level are diffe-
rent and dependent on the physics of the scale in question, the general dynamics
principle behind those mechanisms could very well be similar for all levels. It is
probable that this principle involves the imperfect fit between the speed of the
iterations and the amount of resources available to make these iterative proces-
ses happen. More precisely, the resources required given the natural productive
speed of the iteration process, are always less than the resources available. It is
under competition for limited resources that changes occur on each of the time
scales involved. But there is not only competition, in that some of the emerging
components actually help other components grow, thus establishing supportive
connections. Mutual support and competition for limited resources is recogni-
zed as a major force behind evolution since Darwin's original formulation of
this principle. Similar ideas have been put forward with regard to social and cul-
tural evolution (e.g. Campbell 1960; see van Geert 1985 for an overview). Re-
cently, the present writer has proposed a dynamic systems model of cognitive
and language growth based on the- principle of limited resources (Van Geert
1991, 1992). This does not imply, however, that cultural, individual and biologi-
cal evolution follow the same rules. The rules are clearly different, as we have
seen earlier. However, the rules may be similar as far as a very general, abstract
principle is concerned, and this is the principle of competition for limited re-
sources available, although the nature and mechanisms of the resources and
competition are fully determined by the properties and mechanisms charac-
teristic of the distinct time levels. One should also take into account the fact that
development, or evolution for that matter, is allways 'history-determined'. That
is, change or development starts from a given state of affairs, determined by the
previous history of what it is that changes or develops. It is this fact that limits
and shapes the potential paths which any developing system could go into.
From Vygotsky to dynamic systems
I am convinced that there will be many readers who will object to the claim that
the previous thoughts and explanations are directly related to the Vygotskyan
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heritage. They would say that Vygotsky has never dealt with dynamic systems
and mathematical models, and he would probably have objected to the idea that
humans have innate capacities. The objectors might be right. However, the
point that I wanted to make in this article is that Vygotsky's ideas are still alive
not because of their intrinsic 'exegetic' truth, but because they allow for fruitful
and interesting translations into the problems, methods and models that this
postmodern era offers to developmental researchers. So the question is not whe-
ther Vygotsky was right on all the points he made and the models he conceived.
The question - in a truly Vygotskyan spirit - is rather what Vygotsky can teach
us and how he can inspire contemporary developmental psychology. Of course,
it is of major importance that we have good historical studies, such as Valsmer's
and Van der Veer's, to rely on. We need translations of Vygotsky's texts, so
that we can judge ourselves what the man really said. But the scientific and cul-
tural importance of Vygotsky's work, and of Freud's, Piaget's or Werner's for
that matter, lies not in its factual truth as such, but in its power to inspire current
research and model building and in the possibilities it offers for overcoming the
theoretical dead ends we might have gone into. So, although I would be the first
to caution against a biblical and exegetic interpretation and use of our old mas-
ters, the conclusion of this article sounds pretty religious after all.
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Vygotsky's view on schooling. Reflections
on R. van der Veer and J. Valsiner,
Understanding Vygotsky. A Quest for
Synthesis
Summary
The book by Van der Veer and Valsiner is guided by the idea that creativity in any au-
thor, including Vygot.iky, is possible only in a pluralistic social and intellectual envi-
ronment. This paper explores the idea of authorship, the creative use of existing
cultural possibilities, as an aim of education. It is shown that Vygotsky's ideas on educa-
tion may be interpreted as pointing in that direction. Other interpretations of his ideas
are much more in line with a traditional view of education as the transmission of know-
ledge. This is possible because Vygotsky did not really offer a theory of the role of indi-
vidual authorship in sociocultural knowledge production.
Vygotskij's visie op onderwijs
Van der Veer en Valsiner hebben zich laten leiden door de gedachte dat de creatieve bij-
drage van elke auteur, Vygotskij niet uitgezonderd, slechts begrepen kan worden tegen
de achtergrond van een pluralistische sociale en intellectuele omgeving. In dit artikel
wordt de stelling uitgewerkt dat 'auteurschap ', het creatieve gebruik van culturele moge-
lijkheden, als doel van onderwijs kan worden gezien in een Vygotskijaanse visie. Er zijn
echter ook interpretaties van Vygotskij's ideeën over onderwijs die veel dichter hij een
traditionele opvatting van kennisoverdracht liggen. Mogelijk komt dat doordat Vygoyskij
zelf geen theorie van de sociaal-culturele ontwikkeling van kennis en de rol van het indi-
viduele handelen daarin heeft uitgewerkt.
Authorship
Stephen Toulmin once called Vygotsky 'the Mozart of psychology' (Toulmin
1978). With this characterization, he seems to position Vygotsky as a sort of
prodigy child, an isolated genius who all by himself revolutionized psychology.
It would be a lucky coincidence, then, that the book by Van der Veer and Valsi-
ner was published in the Mozart year 1991. However, the position the authors
Sleutelwoorden: ontwikkelingspsychologie; leertheorie; Sovjetunie.
Wim Wardekker is universitair docent bij de vakgroep Pedagogiek, sectie Onderwijspui.i
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Amsterdam.
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take is exactly opposite to this characterization. What they have done can be
elucidated by a comparison to the work of the Rembrandt Project in art.
The Rembrandt Project art historians have for a number of years now
been occupied to single out those works of art that can be definitely prover
have been painted by Rembrandt himself. A great number of paintings formerly
ascribed to him are not included in their lists any more. I am not talking aboui
falsifications. These works were painted, possibly in Rembrandt's workshop, by
his pupils and aides, maybe supervised and helped by the master himself
historical fact shows that Rembrandt was not an isolated genius. He used, in an
admittedly very original and creative way, the possibilities and the pictorial
language of his time. Above all, he worked in a cooperative setting that was
thought normal at the time The idea of creativity and artisticity that informs the
Rembrandt Project and has lead to the exclusion of the work of this coöperatie
from the lists would, I think, have surprised Rembrandt very much. It shows our
present preoccupation with individual achievement, and implies a view o
tivity which isolates it from the social and cognitive environment whicl
is constitutive for it (cf. for the same point on Mozart: Elias 19'
In a sense, Van der Veer and Valsiner have done something along
same lines with the works of Vygotsky as the Rembrandt Project did with R
brandt. But they obviously did so with a different intention. The writers
to dispute this modern view of creativity. In their view, Vygotsky has been see
too much as an isolated genius. They did a lot of scholarly work
gotsky within his social and intellectual environment, so that it becoir
that his genius could not have existed without this background and coope.
His theory is thus shown to be a milestone in an existing line of 1
thinking, and at the same time it constitutes a program which opens
Possibilities for creative scientific work. Still, the theme of the book is th
as that of the Rembrandt exhibition. Let us call it authorship.
The view of authorship, of creativity, that the authors exhibit i
(and clearly do not share with the art historians behind the Rembrandt
is itself a very Vygotskian one. It does not, of course, deny that a pei
is involved, that there are some persons, e.g. Vygotsky or Rembrandt, wh
tinguish themselves from others in creativity and originality,
does not reside exclusively in the individual; creativity does not coi
ted, unpredictable divergent productions. It can only exist in a stimulate
and intellectual community. On the part of the creative individual, aurt
seems, on the evidence of the Vygotsky story, to imply a number
broad insight into the ideas of this community (informedness), ope.
ness, the ability and audacity to think and act for yourself, and commit
worthwhile causes. This is so because creativity is not restricted t
is a characteristic of the way in which activities are carried out.
In this paper, I want to consider some of the implications for edu,
this concept of authorship. For while I do not want to imply tl
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could become a Rembrandt or Vygotsky, I do think that every person can have
something of this quality of authorship. Moreover, I think a Vygotskian position
implies that to a certain extent, creativity and the capacity for authorship can
and should be taught, or at least promoted by education. This is a formidable
task for education. For if there is anything that society needs, it is not people
who have been trained to do a well-circumscribed job; it is people who generate
and communicate ideas, who can make a contribution to the dynamics of society.
In the next section, I will first try to make clear what is meant by the con-
cept of education for authorship. Next, I will consider whether this idea of edu-
cation is consistent with Vygotsky's thoughts on the subject of education, and
why some interpretations of his ideas take a different approach.
Education for authorship
To make my argument clear, I first want to elaborate on the idea of authorship
as an educational aim. This aim is an implication of the fact that we live in a so-
cial world, constructed by pluralistic semiotic productions. This does not only
mean that we cannot guarantee with certainty our knowledge or our perspecti-
ves on the world by reference to the supposed objectivity of an independent
world. More than that, it implies that no single perspective, no single world
view is adequate to understand the world.
Thus, on the one hand the monolithic universalist position is denied,
which states that there is one way of viewing the world, one knowledge base
(usually the scientific one) that ultimately is the most rational and therefore the
only defensible one. Such monolithic views are always the product of a social
hegemony. On the other hand, it is neither a purely relativistic position which
says that every community has its own arbitrary way of constructing the world,
and no attempt to come to an intcrsubjective understanding can be legitimized.
That position leads only to tolerance: suffering the strange ideas of others with-
out true communication with them. On the contrary, in a pluralistic view com-
munication with others is essential because we need to participate in a dynamic
world. Knowledge is seen here as the continually changing product of an on-
going exchange between acting subjects, constrained by an obstinate reality
which is itself dynamically changing, and mediated by cognitive instruments
which are always provisional (cf. Burbules & Rice 1991 ; Procee 1991).
This interaction, or dialogue, does not only take place in actual contact
with others, but is a characteristic of all modes of thinking and speaking. Every
utterance, every text (taken in a broad sense as any semiotic production) is in-
tertextual in essence, combining elements from many different voices and texts;
an author is never alone, never the only source of what is said. This is not only
true of the cognitive realm; it also holds for artistic productions and for moral
positions - in fact, pluralism is itself a moral position.
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Clifford Geertz (1988) has made a distinction between 'writers' and 'au-
thors'. We can extend his distinction to the domain of educational aims. Being a
writer implies being able to convey meanings and data within an existing frame-
work which is taken for granted. In education this corresponds to the notion of
functional literacy. By contrast, authorship means being able to speak or think
for yourself, taking full responsibility, not relying on the authority of others.
Educating children to be authors thus is probably very much related to what Ha-
bermas refers to as the acquisition of communicative competence. It stands for
being able to participate in the dynamics of culture. This implies having the
conceptual network of cultural meanings at one's disposal, and being able to
manipulate these in an insightful way; it implies having an open mind, and
knowing that no position, meaning or concept can have absolute or ultimate
authority; in short, it implies being able to think under your own responsibility
and to participate in culture in a constructive way. It is going 'beyond the infor-
mation given' in a much more pregnant sense than Bruner used that expression.
My educational argument is that it is neither necessary nor desirable to
distinguish a priori between (future) writers and authors on the basis of some
opposed innate ability. Authorship and its acquisition are fundamentally social
in nature.
Vygotsky and authorship
There are many elements in the argument so far that are congenial to, or indeed
inspired on, the ideas and conceptual framework of Vygotsky. In this section, I
will elaborate an interpretation of his work which highlights these elements.
It is clear that Vygotsky attached paramount importance to education i
family and school for the development of thinking and consciousness. In fact,
higher psychological processes develop only through education (in it
sense), that is, through enculturation and participating in cultural meanings. Vy-
gotsky 's theory of this development stresses the fact that consciousness is dyne
mic, holistic, social, and semiotic. These features provide a much better sema
tic structure for the idea of authorship as a goal of education than the charac-
teristics of most other theories of development of consciousness do. I will
some very short indications of what I take to be a Vygotskian interpretatie
consciousness and its development.
Firstly, consciousness is social in origin. In his study of the ontogenes
mind, Vygotsky shows that the interaction structures, patterns and scripts prc
ded by the social environment are internalized. At first, children imitate signi
cant social others, thus thinking 'on power borrowed from others', acting c
'loan of consciousness' as Bruner has so aptly said (Bruner 1986, p. 1
they are able to think 'for themselves', by internalizing the voices of thes
others. Thus, thinking always is dialogical in nature. Nobody thinks alone, th
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other voice is always present. This implies that the plurality of the social world
is also internalized.
The same holds true of Vygotsky's key concept, the zone of proximal de-
velopment. This zone is not a stable quality of the individual child. It emerges in
the interaction of the child with a 'significant' other who challenges it to do
something it is not yet able to do by itself. Thus, the zone is a quality of the spe-
cific social situation, with a specific other and a specific challenge. Here too, it
is clear that development is an interpsychical process. Identity development and
the socially provided resources for that development are interdependent (Valsi-
ner 1988, p. 145). For schooling, this means that educational tasks and the
teacher's actions should be carefully planned to provide a zone of proximal de-
velopment for each pupil.
The concept of the zone of proximal development also draws attention to
the fact that thinking is dynamic and holistic. As Valsiner has pointed out (Val-
siner 1988, p. 137), learning in the zone is not simply a matter of adding some
new action to an already existing repertoire. It is more about restructuring the
task situation. Gaining a new insight or competence reorganizes the structure of
thinking: learning is in many cases a holistic, hence dynamic, process.
Next, thinking and its development are semiotic processes in Vygotsky's
view. They are mediated, not just by physical signs, but mainly by cultural
meanings and other artifacts. Human consciousness is text-based. It is language,
i.e. meanings, which gradually structures and organizes thinking, thus transfor-
ming thinking from a 'natural' into a 'higher' psychological process.
In the development of the semiotic consciousness formal schooling fulf i ls
a special role. Because it confronts pupils with what Vygotsky calls scientific
concepts, which are given to them as elements in a semantic network, it chal-
lenges them to focus their attention on the semantic expression of the concepts
themselves instead of on the external referents of these concepts, thus paving
the way for intentional mental manipulation of concepts and their meanings.
This ability for intentional manipulation of meanings may be an essential condi-
tion for the aim of authorship. It need not, by the way, be confined to the logical
scientific way of manipulating meanings: there are other ways of thinking (cf.
Tulviste 1991; White 1990).
In this context it should be stressed that Vygotsky's view of schooling
was far from a traditional one. He emphasized that scientific and everyday con-
cepts are interdependent and must develop together. As Luis Moll says (Moll
1990, p. 10), 'It is through the use of everyday concepts that children make sen-
se of the definitions and explanations of scientific concepts; everyday concepts
provide the "living knowledge" for the development of scientific concepts. That
is, everyday concepts mediate the acquisition of scientific concepts... To make
schooling significant one must go beyond the classroom walls, beyond empty
verbalisms; school knowledge grows into the analysis of the everyday.' In other
places, Vygotsky stressed that it is only possible to transmit meanings, the soci-
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ally shared 'common denominator' or even the dictionary definition of con-
cepts. Pupils must 'make sense' of these by connecting them to their own expe-
riences, and schools must help in this process. This means school is not just
concerned with the transmission of knowledge, but with the participation (ap-
prenticeship) of pupils in a cultural praxis.
With such ideas, Vygotsky was much closer to progressive education than
he is normally made out to be. Moll again (1990, p. 13): 'The focus is not on
transferring skills as such, from those who know more to those who know less,
but on the collaborative use of mediational means to create, obtain, and commu-
nicate meaning. The role of the adult is not necessarily to provide structured
cues but, through exploratory talk and other social mediations such as importing
everyday activities into the classroom, to assist children in appropriating or
taking control of their own learning.'
Appropriating scientific concepts, endowing them with sense, and taking
control of your own learning processes: these are steps in a process, the intend-
ed outcome of which might be described as 'learning to think in a scientific
way' (Van Oers 1992). The most important characteristic of scientific thinking
in this context is that it is critical of all assumptions and of everything taken for
granted, including itself, and that it is flexible and dynamical. Scientific con-
cepts help break the naive realism which is characteristic of everyday thinking.
Scientific thinking does not take the world as it appears, and as it is represented
in culturally accepted meanings, for granted. This opens up the possibility of
dialogue with rival perspectives on reality, of a dynamic interaction, and of
Production of new insights, of taking responsibility for your own thinking and
not just think on the authority of others.
So from the above it would seem that Vygotsky's theory of educati.
indeed be considered, if not itself a theory of authorship as the aim of education,
then at least in many of its elements pointing toward that aim and useful in coi
structing a coherent view. Still, there are some important objections to this
Pretation of Vygotsky's theory. I will consider some of these in the next section.
Authorship versus authority
Many of those who have based their educational theories on those of Vygotsky,
including such eminent scholars as Davydov, Gal'perin and Van Parreren, nav«
come to very different models of the aims and procedures of schooling.
Veer and Valsiner also give an interpretation that resembles those model
than the ideas I have proposed.
The main difference is that in these models a rather more tradit
of schooling is espoused, in which the transmission of cultural meanings, espe-
cially in the form of scientifically certified knowledge and of intellect
's seen as the most important goal of schools. Vygotsky's contnbi
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seen in his opposition to models of instruction where the pupil is given a predo-
minantly passive role in the absorption of information. His research shows that
the child is an active participant in the teaching-learning process. This is neces-
sarily so, because knowledge must develop ontogenetically to be of functional
value and cannot be transmitted as such. From the point of view of ontogenesis,
knowledge is dynamic. In this, Vygotsky is pictured as advocating a position
common to other educationalists of his time, among them Herbart and Piaget
The most important difference is that Piaget thinks of development as an indivi-
dual process, while Vygotsky stresses its social origin and character. Also, Pia-
get tends to see the outcome of the development process in terms of logical
laws, while for Vygotsky the possibilities offered by the specific culture are of
paramount importance.
In this interpretation, school aims essentially at the development of intel-
lectual skills on the basis of adequate knowledge. Scientific concepts are intro
duced to promote conscious awareness of these intellectual skills so thinking
becomes an intentional process and knowledge processing comes under volun
tary control. These scientific concepts are characterized by systematicitv ab
straction and preciseness; and thus, scientific thinking as a goal of education is
equated to abstract and precise thinking with the help of the products of science
With respect to their content, scientific concepts have been validated by science'
and thus are vested with authority. They serve to break the false authority of
everyday concepts and replace it with the authority of science 'Making sense'
of school knowledge implies restructuring the world as seen through everydav
concepts in terms of a scientific world view. Concepts like the zone of proximal
development can serve to devise diagnostical and didactical techniques to ac
complish this in school. In other words, this interpretation rests on a monolithic
view of knowledge, where science is hegemonial.
This view of schooling is not without problems. Among the criticisms that
have been levelled against it are the following.
a. Scientific concepts tend to be acquired into a system of meanings sena
rate from everyday concepts. In many cases, there is no interpénétration Pupils
acquire scientific concepts only as word meanings, not as instruments thinking
devices, in their relation to the world. An example from Bozovic (quoted bv
Hundeide 1985) is well known. Pupils, having been taught Archimedes' law
would duly respond in terms of that law when asked by the teacher why a piece
of wood will float in water. But when the researcher posed this same question
outside of the formal educational setting, the same children answered with
'everyday' conceptualizations like "wood floats because it is light" When the
researcher pointed out the difference in answers to them, they showed they were
still able to give the 'school' type answer.
Researchers have given various, although related, explanations for this
phenomenon. De Corte (1990), for instance, takes the view that it is an outcome
of the epistemological context in which learning took place. He advocates di-
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dactical methods which facilitate transfer. According to De Corte, the answer
lies in constructing what he calls 'powerful learning environments', which are
constructed in such a way that the skill to be learned can be situated in various
relevant contexts. This should give the pupils ample opportunity to contextuah-
ze the abstract scientific concepts. The concepts to be learned will become mean-
ingful for the pupils when they see in what different contexts they can be used.
However, I want to point out that the use of scientific concepts is not always
preferred even by those who know 'better'. None of us have any objections to
saying that it is light this morning because the sun has risen, although this is in
no way a scientific proposition. This way of expressing a fact is socially accept-
able to us, and it will do no harm because there are no actions to be taken. The
use of causal scientific propositions in everyday situations would seem to be de-
pendent on social and action conditions. So the pupils in the BoZovic study may
not have been just victims of bad schooling.
b. In as much as an interpénétration of everyday and scientific c
does happen, Vygotsky seems to paint an overly harmonic picture of
Van der Veer & Valsiner, p. 317). Where scientific concepts 'grow down
the domain of personal experience, they will not only provide flex,
consciousness of thinking, but also consciousness of contradictions an«
mas in that experience. It is not the case that all such experiential contn
will be resolved by using scientific concepts. The world cannot
viewed from one single perspective.
c. Scientific concepts, interpreted as the products of science, have
al status in our culture. De Corte seems to overlook that it is a chara(
our culture's view of science that everyday knowledge is treated N
as misconceptions that should soon be abolished and replaced by the sen
concepts which are of so much better quality. Our culture attaches higl
science and low status to everyday knowledge. The knowledge prc
science imply a specific ideology: that of precision through objecti
cietal disinterestedness. This affirms their authority, and implicitly a
gemonial mode of thought in our society. It also teaches pupils to deal
world and with other people in a detached, 'rational' way - a form ol
called partial or 'bisected' by the Frankfurt School. Pupils are bound t
spective of non-perspectivity. Because of the dominance of
thought, teachers and pupils will have difficulties in establishing a good cc
tion or balance with other ways of thinking, especially with the pupil
day cognitions' (Wardekker 1991).
d. The authority with which scientific concepts, in the i
knowledge, are invested, prohibits creative and 'adventurous' thinking ar
ticipation in cultural meaning production on the part of the pupils. There i
contradiction between authority and authorship. Van der Veer and Valsiner
Ch. 13) have found the same problem. They blame it on Vygotsky's cone
imitation: where thinking is learned by imitation, one can hardly expect the
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learner to go beyond the possibilities shown by the adult to be imitated. How-
ever, I think in their interpretation imitation is seen too much just as an interac-
tion between two persons, the child and the adult. The adult should, I think be
seen primarily as a specific representative of the broader possibilities of culture at
large. The interactions with this particular person can always be supplemented
with other interactions. Thus, imitation is not concerned with a particular per-
son, but with culture. In the end, the concept of activity is not to be interpreted
at the individual, but at the supra-individual level: it is a cultural concept, not a
psychological one in the classical sense.
Still, there is a definite problem here at that level too. This problem is di-
rectly connected with the general difference between the two types of theory of
schooling that I have distinguished. I will now turn to an analysis of that diffe-
rence.
The authority of Vygotsky
Notwithstanding its problems, it would seem that this second, monolithic inter-
pretation of Vygotsky's ideas on schooling is closer to a literal interpretation of
Vygotsky's writings. Does this mean we should reject the first interpretation
where authorship was the main issue? I think the authority of Vygotsky is insuf '
ficient reason for that, and moreover, it would not be in his spirit For there is a
certain contradiction between accepting the second, more traditional interpréta
tion of education and its partly undesired outcomes, and his own method of
working and his analysis of the crisis in psychology. We may have another in
stance here of the difference between 'Vygotsky the methodologist' and 'Vv
gotsky the psychologist' (Davydov & Radzhikovskii 1985).
Certainly Vygotsky seems to have accepted some common sense ideas
about schooling at face value. The examples he gives of scientific concepts for
instance, are mainly of hierarchical classifications and taxonomies which are
among the products of scientific thinking least open to criticism and thus seen
to be solid knowledge. But I want to point out that his discussion of scientific
concepts did not originate as an educational problem. To Vygotsky it was r
of a psychological investigation into development, not of an educational discus
sion about aims. Davydov (1977, 1988), Wertsch (1985), Tulviste and o
have pointed out that Vygotsky, in using the term 'scientific concept' was
even referring to the results of science as such, but only to the science'like svs
tematicity with which such concepts are presented to pupils in school Wertsch
advocates the translation 'school concepts' or 'institutional concepts' Ï
this procedure is intimately connected to the characteristics of the t'eachir
learning processes in school. Vygotsky focused on the scripts and procedural
characteristics, not on the cultural content of scientific concepts
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The problem here is not only in the translation, but has wider significance.
Vygotsky developed a theory of the ontogenetic development of knowledge, but
did not proceed to produce a full theory of the social genesis of knowledge, let
alone to combine the two fields. Thus, he tells us that knowledge is dynamical
on the ontogenetic plane, but hardly says anything about the sociodynamics of
knowledge, nor of the possible (future) participation of pupils in the production
and cultural dynamics of knowledge. (It is, for instance, remarkable that Vy-
gotsky seldom uses the concept of ideology.)
This lack of a sociogenetic perspective on knowledge production opens
up the possibility of the two different interpretations 1 have discussed. Van der
Veer and Valsiner for instance, keeping close to the literal text, interpret Vy-
gotsky as tending to see knowledge and cultural meanings as given products of
culture. In this interpretation, meanings are conceived more as cultural tools
than as perspectives. Knowledge systems then are cultural toolkits that are pro-
vided by the culture and are to be appropriated by the child, rather than possible
ways of picturing reality which might be altered in a discursive social process in
which the developing child can learn to participate.
It may well be, however, that such an interpretation is based more on a
common sense view of schooling, where common sense fills the gap that Vy-
gotsky left open by not offering a sociocultural theory of knowledge develop-
ment, than on positive statements by Vygotsky. Given that Vygotsky hardly has
a sociogenetic theory of knowledge, let alone a pluralistic one, it is hardly s
Prising that the hegemonial interpretation of the sociogenesis of knowledge,
with its emphasis on the role of science, comes to the fore.
Still, I think such a pluralistic theory of knowledge would fit very well
into a Vygotskian framework, as for instance Wertsch (1991) has s
combining the ideas of Bakhtin with those of Vygotsky. I think that, mde
elaboration of such a theory is a first priority in order to provide an adequate
theory of schooling in a Vygotskian sense. Why Vygotsky himself die
this, or whether he would have approved of it, are issues of mainly historical :
terest. We are not bound to his authority. Van der Veer and Valsmer
shown him to have originated from an European tradition of thought. In t
namic tradition, Vygotsky's work is one, important moment. We shou
nue to work, to be authors, in that tradition, which implies going beyor
gotsky.
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Vygotsky's modern appeal1
Summary
In this paper three of Vygotsky '.i concepts are presented which are very useful for taking
one's stand in modern discussions on cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind. Be-
haviorism as well as cognitivism have disunited behavior and cognition. Next, extreme
positions either reduce mental phenomena to physical processes, or reduce the world to
social constructions. The three concepts -conscious behaviour', 'development' and 'cul-
ture' are viewed as constituting Vygotsky's programme to integrate thought and action
which can help to avoid social and physicalistic reductions.
Samenvatting
In dit artikel fungeert een aantal begrippen van Vygotskij als inspiratiebron voor een po-
sitiebepaling in moderne discussies binnen de cognitieve filosofie en psychologie. Beha-
viorisme en cognitivisme hebben gedrag en cognitie uit elkaar gespeeld. Vervolgens
reduceren extreme posities ofwel psychische tot fysische verschijnselen, ofwel de wereld
tot sociale constructies. Aan de hand van de begrippen 'bewust gedrag', 'ontwikkt
en 'cultuur' wordt erop geweien hoe Vygotskij's werk een programma voor integratie
van denken en handelen behelsde waarmee sociale enfysicalistische reducties vermeden
kunnen worden.
What I shall present here is not so much about Vygotsky. Rather I shall use
some of his stimulating concepts as guiding ideas towards a viable interpre
tion of the subject matter of psychology and philosophy of mind. In fact, I shall
use his concepts in confrontation with modern conceptions about mind.
I have chosen three of Vygotsky's concepts. And these constitute three
sections of my paper. The first is 'conscious behavior'; it is the idea of the 11
gration of thought and action that Vygotsky and others cherished before beha-
* I am thankful to Jeroen Jans/ for reading an earlier version and for his comments.
Sleutelwoorden: ontwikkelingspsychologie, cognitie; Sovjetunie.
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viorists and cognitivists divided them and concentrated on one of the relata The
second concept is development; the view that all psychological phenomena are
undergoing development. Together with the notion of conscious behaviour it
draws attention to the primacy of the organism-environment relationship. This
constitutes an approach to mental phenomena that is called naturalism. It also
will shed some light on the psychological phenomenon of intentionality. The
third concept taken from Vygotsky is culture or social environment. Though
language and communication are very important means in the human orienta-
tion to the world, naturalism can guard us from the reduction to a complete soci-
al interpretation of this relation.
Conscious behavior
'Let us take, for our example, the familiar child-candle instance... The ordinary in-
terpretation would say the sensation of light is a stimulus to the grasping as a re
sponse, the burn resulting is a stimulus to withdrawing the hand as response and
so on. There is, of course, no doubt that is a rough practical way of representing
the process. But when we ask for its psychological adequacy, the case is quite dif
ferent. Upon analysis, we find that we begin not with a sensory stimulus but with
a sensori-motor coordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is the
movement which is primary, and the sensation which is secondary the movement
of the body, head and eye muscles determining the quality of what is experienced
In other words, the real beginning is with the act of seeing: it is looking and not a
sensation of light. Now if this act, the seeing, stimulates another act the reachine
it is because both of these acts fall within a larger coordination.' (Dewey 1896)
With these words John Dewey - in his famous article on The Reflex Arc Con
cept in Psychology - argued that stimulus and response, or sensation and me
tion as he called them, cannot be separated. They belong to a whole of activities
and functions, directed towards a purpose wich is of relevance for the organism
There is a continous to-and-fro between them, whereas the reflex-arc concent
gives us a disjointed and incoherent psychology which break off this continuity
and leaves us nothing but a series of jerks, an aimless push-and-pull mechanism
according to Dewey. And, in this circuit of experience the organism is not the
plaything of the environment. It is not the environment which dictates what i<
experienced, but the organism itself chooses from all the available or possible
stimuli; to perceive is not a passive event. Dewey and the other prwmatists
made it perfectly clear that thought and action-in-a-context are interrelated
What we believe and the way we act are interdependent; this is the essential
pragmatist psychological principle.
Dewey's criticism was directed at the growing interest for the reflex-mo-
del m psychology at the end of the century, presently the ultimate exolan
of psychological phenomena in the eyes of the behaviorists.
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In Russia, the cradle of 'reflexology', the reflex-model was critized by so-
cialist inspired psychology. I need not stress the point that Marxism underlined
the unity of thought and action, or practice for that matter. In fact there is a
strong historical line of this idea going back to Aristotle. Whereas Marx had a
social and even a political doctrine in mind, the Russian psychologists turned
the idea into a psychological principle, for theoretical reasons as well as for ap-
plied implications. And as such it is a principle as invaluable as the American
pragmatists conception. In contrast with Pavlov's and Bekhterev's reflexologi-
cal reductionism, Kornilov and his co-workers turned their theory of 'reactions'
into a consciousness-oriented behaviorism. Although Kornilov 'stressed the pri-
macy of the external side of reactions over the internal ones' saying:
'[T)o be alive to possess psyche - that means first of all to express oneself in ac-
tion. If living beings only possessed intellect and emotions, but would not express
themselves in actions, there would be no life ... and consequently no psyche.'
(Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p. 115)
He nevertheless stressed also the interrelatedness of reasoning and its external
expression; he called it the 'reasonably acting will' (op. cit., p. 116).
Now Vygotsky was charmed by this idea of the integration of conscious-
ness and action, of relating consciousness with activity. 'We are at the doorstep
of conscious behavior', he noted (op. cit., p. 33). The psychological whole of
the reaction or behavior is more than a simple and straightforward stimulus-re-
spons causality. And he even criticized Kornilov's interactionistic perspective.
For Kornilov the psychological processes were 'functionally dependent' upon
the physiological and behavioral processes, but not reducible to or separable
from the latter (op. cit., p. 123). But with that, argued Vygotsky, 'any wholeness
is immediately eliminated' (op. cit., p. 137). For Vygotsky there cannot be any
trace of dualism. An interpretation of consciousness 'must be found in the c
line of phenomena together with all reactions of the organism... Conscic
is the problem of the structure of behavior' (op. cit., p. 135), and with 'structure'
he meant structural unity. Vygotsky opted for a dynamic conception c
ousness; consciousness not as an ontological entity, not as something we can
run accross round the corner, as it were, but as a process, a conscious behavioral
process.
Although we nowadays like to think about mind as a process or a set of
functions, many psychologists, and among them the cognitivists preeminently,
nevertheless trace the mind in the head, and lock it up within the skull
body. Or they compress it into a sub-system, an information-processing
system which works autonomously. It works not really independent of the outsi
de world, of course, because there is an input and an output, but these are r
the real problems, they are taken for granted; to trace the mind it is the internal
process that matters.
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There are cognitivist birds of different feathers. If you are a cognitivist,
leaning towards the reduction of mind to physiology, you neglect the product,
behavior, by concentrating on an inside process, the working of the brain or the
nervous system. The latest fashion in experimental cognitive psychology, con-
nectionism, is the modern successor to the mind-brain identity theory. But if
you are a so-called classical cognitivist, a computationalist, you study an inter-
mediate level, a kind of programme, independent from the implementation, the
materialized body or hardware on the one side, and the level of the daily behavi-
or on the other side. Then you are also a kind of materialist but not an identity-
theorist.
The latter, the classical cognitivists, reduce mind to a formal system with
strong linguistic features, a 'language of mind'. The mind is a network of pro-
positions or mental sentences, held together by syntactic rules. But the problem
is where does this formal system get its semantics from? After all, the proposi-
tions or sentences we use everyday do have meanings, so what about the alleged
mental ones. The cognitivists are very ambiguous about this. Sometimes they
seem to think that meanings pop up within the system, but sometimes they think
that meanings or semantics aren't necessary for the study of mental processes.
Fodor's methodological solipsism (Fodor 1980) is notorious for this idea. He is
well aware that meaning is a kind of refering to the world. But psychology, he
argues, studies mental states, such as beliefs, irrespective of questions about the
real existence of the objects of those beliefs in an outside world. Against the be-
haviorist, he claims that we are able to understand and predict Patricia's behavi-
or only on account of her belief, let's say, about Dracula. We are able to under-
stand why she hangs a rope of garlic at the window by only refering to her be-
liefs and expectations about the vampire. Whether the horrifying count really
does exist has no effect upon the causal power of Patricia's belief. So, we can
approach the mind as a solipsistic or individualistic device, a mind in a vat, so
to speak.
Searle, although definitely not a friend of the language of thought-cogniti-
vism, nevertheless also adheres to a similar solipsistic theory about mind.
'Mental phenomena, whether conscious or unconscious, whether visual or audito
ry, pains, t ickles, itches, thoughts, and all the rest of our mental life, are caused by
processes in the brain... the relevant causal processes are entirely internal to the
brain... Though in fact mental events mediate between external stimuli and motor
responses, there is no essential connection.' (Searle 1987, p. 221 )
And to illustrate this idea he gives us the following example.
'A man could have a terrible pain without having either a pain stimulus or any
pain behavior. And he adds: this simple fact is sufficient to discredit the entire be-
haviorist tradition...' (ibid.)
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In these conceptions aboul mind there is no necessary relation between the indi-
vidual's being in mental states and what they arc about, i.e. her natural or social
environment. What in fact these views boil down to is that mental states are su-
pervenient on physical states, specified independently of the physical and social
conditions obtaining outside the body. It is in perfect harmony with the cogniti-
ve criticism, aimed at behaviorism, judging by Searle's quotation and put by
Chomsky like this: 'As a general designation for psychology, "behavioral scien-
ce" is about as apt as "meter reading science" would be for physics.' Thus,
whilst behaviorists negated mind, cognitivists neglect behavior.
The quality of refering to the world, smoothed over by the cognitivists, or
taken by them as a logical property of certain sentences, is called 'intentionali-
ty'. And for a long time philosophers of mind have rightly contended that inten-
t ional i ty , is the very quality of mind. Exactly because of its refering quality
mind is not a formal system, neither is it the property of something in us. brains
for instance, as Searle would have it. Mental states are identified by content and
this content or meaning is not a property of the words or sentences themselves
which pop up .is .in (.-licet of the syntax of a formal system. We have to avoid
the assumption that concepts and propositions lie ready within us. And we have
to replace it with the idea that what happens within us carries no meaning in it-
self, but acquires meaning at the moment of perceiving, uttering, acting, in a si-
tuation; thus when it is used in a environment. With meanings we relate oursel-
ves to the world. This is the quality of intentionality; it is our engagement with
the world. Our mental slates have content, are about something. We are oriented
to the world, because we have an interest m the world.
In order to attach sense, to form a belief about the world, we have to move
around, to handle things, to experience the world. In order to act we have to be-
lieve (to have theories or proto-theories) and in order to think we have to act. 'A
belief is something upon which a man is prepared to act', as the pragmatist
Ch.S. Peirce loved to phrase it; and 'practice is the judge of thought', as Vy-
gotsky would have it. I take t ins glass because I think it contains water; I t h i n k
i t ' s water because H tastes l ike i t . i t feels l ike water Thinking and acting are in-
terdependent. Mind or cognition is the ongoing recycling of thinking, acting,
perceiving, talking, to be motivated, to be emotional. There is no mind in us; it
is .1 whole ol i n t e r n a l and externa l functions. This is. as 1 take it , the meaning of
Vygotsky's 'conscious behavior'.
And if you think there is too much common sense psychology in it , so be
it. This is what psychology is aboul In spite of starry-eyed cogmtivist crusaders
m search for a psychological language which is scientific but barren (e.g.
Churehland, Stich and many others). Many common sense psychological terms
are not vague at all hut are very subtle as a result of hundreds of years of discri-
minat ions . But this is a separate story.
Vygotsky showed more sensitivity to the real psychological issues than
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many cognitivists nowadays. This is part of the reason why modern critics of
cognitivism go back to Vygotsky and find in his work a source of inspiration.
Development
My second choice out of Vygotsky's stimulating ideas is expressed in the con-
cept of development. Already in the Introduction of the book of Van der Veer &
Valsiner the authors stress the point that in Vygotsky's writings there is 'this
meta-theoretical perspective: a consistent emphasis on viewing all psychologi-
cal phenomena as those which are undergoing development' (Van der Veer &
Valsiner 1991, p. 2). Later in the book the authors report that Vygotsky critici-
zed the tendency in the study of mental processes to translate the flow of expe-
riences into static constructs. The reader will be familiar with the Hegelian-
Marxist constitutive notion of dialectic and the qualitative leap of the synthesis.
I also pass over Vygotsky's own elaboration of the idea of development in his
paedology, because most of the readers of this journal are experts in that field. I
head straight for my own philosophy of mind hobby-horses in this matter.
In the first section I stressed the conscious-behavioral unity. This concep-
tion is not at all far away from the insight that psychological processes, taken as
such, play an instrumental role in the development of the person. 'Evolution',
including the notions of adaptation and coping, was already the major theme un-
derlying all pragmatist's discussions of a philosophical nature, whether it was
the world, science, or psychology. As for the Russian psychologists a happy
phrase comes to my mind, it was a maxim of Blonsky: 'behavior can be viewed
only as history of behavior' (op. cit., p. 170). And again, it means a step back-
wards in theory and sophistication that the cognitivists, at least computational
style, down-play evolution and history. It is in accordance with the way they
isolate cognition from the environment. At the back of their minds there is that
rationalistic strain, the underlining of a fixed nature, for instance, in that unpro-
fitable nature-nurture controversy. Both the isolation and the fixity belong to the
physicalistic interpretation of psychology. It is the conception that individuals in
the same physical, functional, and dispositional states make the same contribu-
tions to their psychological states (Baker 1987, p. 4). The individual minds are
interchangeable as it were. Physically indistinguishable individuals with the
same histories, that is to say with no histories at all, are to be assigned the same
psyche.
This physicalistic interpretation of psychology leaves us with a physicalis-
tic but at the same time unworldly mind. By rejecting this interpretation, howe-
ver, we are not at all committed to a supernatural or metaphysical conception of
mind. On the contrary, we are perfectly well able to stay within the framework
of nature. To take evolution into account, to see mindful behavior as instrumen-
tal in the development of a person is to opt in favour of a naturalistic interpreta-
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tion of psychology. I prefer this concept of naturalism to materialism because of
the flavour of an ontological stuff in the latter, the world of sticks, stones, pro-
tons, neurons and so on. On the other hand naturalism is sometimes taken as
more in keeping with the laws and methodology of natural science, in other
words again: physicalism (Looren de Jong 1990). The Churchlands, very influ-
ential in the philosophy of mind nowadays, contend, for instance, that cognition
or acquiring knowledge is an essentially neurobiological phenomenon and that
naturalizing psychology means reducing it to ncurobiology (see e.g. Churchland
1990, p. 225). To regard the biology of neurons as nothing but the biology of
whole organisms and humans in their natural and social environment is at least
a simplification. Neural networks are part of the materialization of mind; they
are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition.
On the other hand, a naturalistic interpretation of psychology in the sense
of primacy of organism-environment relationship and not in the sense of exten-
ding the methods of physiology and physics to psychology, is a far better option
than a so-called 'Geisteswissenschaftliche' or even an overstated hermeneutic
conception of psychology; I return to this later on. 1 take Vygotsky's notions of
development and conscious behavior as features of a naturalistic program of
that kind.
Let me, briefly, connect this naturalism with our friend 'intentionality'.
Intentionality is often considered as a spooky property of a volatile mind; or it
has been down-played as nothing but etc. The ghostly character was due to an
unhappy a-priori dualism of mind and matter. Now we see mind in its behavio-
ral role, following in the pragmatists and Vygotsky's wake, we need not separa-
te it from the body anymore. Indeed many theorist have emphasized the bodily
nature of mind. Recently, to give only one example, Mark Johnson (1987) wrote
a book with the title: The body in the mind. The bodily basis of meaning, imagi-
nation, and reason. He shows us how our body imposes itself upon many of our
concepts.
By seeing, moreover, the instrumental role of this mindful body in the de-
velopment of humans, we are in a good position to naturalize intentionality. In-
tentionality is the natural relation of organisms to their environment, it starts
with the fundamental biological need to stay alive and to cope with and in the
world, and it develops into the motivation to make sense of the world. It is the
ultimate reason for doing things, to perceive, to conceptualize, to love, to act
and so on. Because of the biological element there is the suggestion that inten-
tionality is not a characteristic of only higher mental functions as believing or
intending; and the evolutionary perspective implies that there is no necessity to
limit the relation to human beings. So it seems reasonable to contend that we
can find a gradation of intentionality among the species.
Let me finish this section with a short remark on connectionism or the
cognitive science of neural networks. Though neuro-philosophers as the
Churchlands go on emasculating intentionality and eliminating it from the
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scientific agenda, another connectionist philosopher William Bechtel at least
tries to solve the problem within the connectionist framework. Whereas a tradi-
tional cognitivist model does rely on internal representations as its processing
units encoded by the programmer, a connectionist system produces internal re-
presentations as responses to its inputs; and it is possible to develop systems that
adjust the weights of their connections in such a way as to develop their own
system for categorizing inputs. So the system is able to respond on 'its own' ini-
tiative to relevant features of the environment in the appropriate manner. They
'learn' in a way.
'This combination of tuning itself to its environment - comments Bechtel - and
not operating totally in terms of syntactically encoded representations may make it
more reasonable to take the activities of connectionist systems as genuinely being
about things in their environment, and hence enjoying a more intrinsic intentiona-
lity than traditional cognitive models.' (Bechtel 1990, p. 256)
Judging by his phrase: 'tuning itself to its environment' Bechtel seems to under-
stand what intentionality is about. But I have my doubts about the intentionality
of the connectionist model, because the model doesn't have an inner urge to act
to respond or to categorize for that matter; it doesn't tune itself to the environ-
ment at all, in the sense of, let us say, an outgrowth of the biological urge stay-
inn - i 1 1 v / i .ing alive
Culture
I now come to Vygotsky's concept of culture. And again, the social nature of
human beings is a very old idea, emphasized by Marx's conception from man
the tool-maker to labor and its constraints on social engagement The importan
ce of the social environment for human beings appeals to the imagination of all
those who take exception against the physicalistic interpretation of psychology
Although I attach great value to the idea, I would guard against overplaying
one's hand. We meet much overstatement and exaggeration in circles where one
points to a fundamental relativism in the relation of human beings to the world
As I see it, because of the naturalistic strain in his own philosophy Vyeotskv
would have avoided a relativistic turn. Wertsch emphasizes Vygotsky's 'multi
domain strategy' (Wertsch 1985, p. 42 f f.). Vygotsky tried to avoid two funda-
mental forms of reductionism. First, the assumption that all aspects of cognition
and cognitive development can be explained by biological principles and phe-
nomena. Second, the assumption that psychological processes can be explained
'solely on the basis of mastery and internalization of symbolic means or SOCK,
cultural practices' (op. cit., p. 43).
420
Cognitive development and Vygotsky
Socio-cultural reductionism or relativism is the outgrowth of the miscon-
ception that language is the only way of our engagement with the world; the
idea that we see and experience the world only through language; that the world
is a kind of text to be interpreted by us. And because of the fact that language is
an utterly social phenomenon the world and our relation to it vanish in consen-
sus and, mutual understanding. Philosophers as the later Habermas and Rorty
change the subject-object relation into a subject-subject, 'Ich-Du' relation: the
world as a conversation piece, a salon. For Habermas, for instance, the only va-
luable action is communicative action, because all other action is strategic and
turns out to be exploitation. Shotter, to take another example, following Wright
Mil ls as he says, contends that the basic function of language is not the repre-
sentation of things in the world, but that 'it works to create, to sustain and trans-
form various patterns of social relations and by implication, various forms of
mentality or subjectivity' (Shotter 1991, p. 70).
I do not underestimate the powerful social function of language, but a too
exclusive emphasis upon this function is at variance with the naturalistic con-
ception of intentionality in favour of which I argued in the previous section.
The relativistic approach also can lead to the rhetorical conception of
science. Of course there is much rhetoric in science, but between this recogni-
tion and the conception that doing science is only a matter of persuasion there is
a world of difference. I am not sympathetic to the idea that the search for truth
is nothing but the will to truth, the will to power, in the words of Nietzsche-Fou-
cault.
Naturalism comprises realism but, take care, this is not a realism physica-
listic or positivistic style. Our worldview does not mirror the world-order. In
perceiving we do not receive data, i.e. meaningful data, in a causal way. Truths
are never the way things are but bear upon the way we think or say the world is.
We need truths for actions, otherwise we couldn't stay alive or move around in
the world. Nevertheless our thoughts, propositions, and theories are fallible.
Truth is liable to confutation, this liability is its disposition like the brittleness of
glas. Realism and relativism are condemned to each other in a way, so to speak
(Bern 1989).
Conclusion
Let me finish with this short conclusion. The inspiration we can draw from rea-
ding Vygotsky and reading about his work is that there is a viable middle course
between reductionistic positions in psychology. On the one hand we have physi-
calistic interpretations which reduce mind to a formal system of a language of
thought or to neural networks. On the other hand we have extreme rhetorical,
hermeneutical or social constructionist interpretations, reducing the world to
consensus and mutual understanding. Mind, however, is an abbreviation for a
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complicated whole of human functions in the world. In order to understand
mental phenomena we have to pay attention to our physiological make-up
which is a necessary condition, as well as to the contents of these phenomena,
that is, the way we as natural and social beings give meanings to the world. This
constitutes a sophisticated middle course which contains much sensitivity to the
unities of thought and action, of mind and body, and to the notion of develop-
ment in a natural and social environment.
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René van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner
Voices at play: Understanding Van der Veer
and Valsiner
Summary
The contributors all address issues that are central to Vygotsky's thinking and that need
to be further elaborated. Modern (cognitive) theorv is often not explicitly developmental
and has, for example, no adequate conception of the sociogenelic roots of intentionality.
Furthermore, developmental models are seldom made e\pln it or formalized and no ade-
quate conception of the relation between different tune scales in development is at hand.
We still lack a satisfying conception of the relation between cultural transmission and
spontaneous knowledge construction. In the opinion of the authors a central develop-
mental mechanism is imitation 'sensu' Raldwin. which allows the child to transcend the
boundaries of his own culture and, perhaps, to become an 'auctor intellectualis '.
Samenvatting
Alle hi/dnigen stellen kwesties aan de orde die centraal staan in Vygotskij's denken en
die verdere uitwerking behoeven. De eigentijdse (cognitieve) theorie i.s vaak niet uitge-
sproken ontwikkelingsgericht en heeft bijvoorbeeld geen adequate opvatting van de so-
ciogenetisdte wortels van intentionaliteit. Bovendien worden ontwikkelingsmodellen
lelden geëxpliciteerd of geformaliseerd en is er geen adequate conceptie van de verschil-
lende tijdschalen in ontwikkeling voorhanden. We missen nog steeds een bevredigende
conceptie van de relatie tussen culturele transmissie en spontane kennisvorming. Naar
de mening van de auteurs is imitatie 'sensu' Baldwin een centraal ontwikkelingsmecha-
nisme dat het kind in staat stelt de gren:en van :i/n eigen cultuur te overschrijden en.
wellicht, tot 'auctor intellectualis ' te worden.
It is of remarkable intellectual pleasure for us to join in the authoritative dis-
course on developmental and educational voices, the polyphony of which was
triggered by our joint effort to understand the social themes which were playing
Sleutelwoorden: ontwikkelingspsychologie; leertheorie; Sovjetunie.
René van der Veer ( 1952) is universitair hoofddocent bij de vakgroep Algemene Pedagogiek
van de Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden. Adres: Vakgroep Algemene Pedagogiek, Rijksumversi
leit Leiden. Wasscnaarseweg 52. 2312 AK Leiden.
hum Viilsiner ( 1951) is werk/aam als associate professor hij het Developmental Program
van het Department of Psychology van de University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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in the mind of Lev Vygotsky. Indeed, this polyphony is clearly inspired by the
polyphonic nature of Vygotsky's work itself and the contributors to this issue of
Comenius either pick up a theme from Vygotsky's work to which they feel par-
ticularly attracted, or try to argue that the different themes did not always har-
monize according to the laws of counterpoint. All of them, however, treat Vy-
gotsky's work as basically unfinished and attempt to finish the score, so to
speak, to rewrite a theme so that it harmonizes better with some other theme, or
to make more explicit a theme that Vygotsky expressed 'sotto voce'.
In doing so they naturally interpret, extend, and change Vygotsky's origi-
nal ideas and thereby illustrate one of the fundamental themes of our study: any
scientific text (or voice) forms part of a universe of other texts and cannot be re-
ally understood without an understanding of these other texts. The only way to
come to a fundamental appreciation of Vygotsky's significance for the social
sciences is to trace these different texts and voices in his work and to recon-
struct the way he synthesized them into a single, albeit unfinished whole. But in
this process one must highlight some voices more than others, ignore some texts
and select others, in short, one must create one's own synthesis and thereby join
in the never-ending process of authoring new texts (cf. Clark & Holquist 1984)
Bern's reading of our treatise on Vygotsky leads him to an illuminating
criticism of our modern fashion of 'cognitive science'. Indeed, fashions come
and go, but most of the fundamental problems remain without satisfactory solu-
tions. So we may soon (in 1996) celebrate the centennial of the classic dispute
between John Dewey and James Mark Baldwin on the conceptualization of the
reflex arc, but our disputes on that theme (often claiming to follow Vygotsky or
Bakhtin, or even Leontiev) seem to stay within the information given by the his-
tory of psychology. Bern actually comes to the central limiting condition that
renders modern cognitivism unproductive, when he claims that 'what happens
within us carries no meaning in itself, but acquires meaning at the moment of
perceiving, uttering, acting, in a situation...' (p. 417, emphasis added). It is here
that the inevitable dependency of all experiencing (as a process) upon the irre-
versibility of time becomes clear. Modern cognitivism - whatever specific kind
it might be - attempts at a static reconstruction of a hyperdynamic process.
Hence cognitivism cannot capture the essence of psychological reality without
moving on to take an explicitly developmental perspective - a move that Vy-
gotsky consistently argued for in the course of all his dialogues with his con-
temporary voices in psychology.
Furthermore, as Bern points out, the modern fashion for connectionism in
cognitive science remains blind to the qualitative leap (in the making of agency
in development) from the 'biological urge staying alive' (p. 420) to self-organi-
zation of intentionality. Again, Vygotsky's concern with the relation of the issue
of 'free will' with that of the sociogenetic roots of intentionality plays along the
same tune. Just mere adaptive learning from the world is not sufficient for the
development of mental functions. Instead, a qualitative leap - in the form of
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dialectical synthesis - must take place to bring the developing person to the sta-
te of relative autonomy from the adaptation pressures of any time. The construc-
tion of higher psychological functions in development entails an ever-increasing
difference of our reflections about the world from that world itself. The subjec-
tive psychological world in its personal uniqueness is a new basis for encounte-
ring uncertain situations in the future. Thus, only if the connectionist models
were to include moments of dialectical synthesis - which would entail not mere
'adjustment of weights of their connections' but new principles by which the
connections are made (i.e., new 'game rules' so to say) - modern cognitivism
might claim the novelty and scientific rigor that is currently communicated
mostly by persuasion. Bern's constructive criticism of cognitivism constitutes a
pleasant extension of the framework of ideas that occupied Vygotsky in his life-
time and which have been puzzling us during our effort to make sense of Vy-
gotsky.
A similar theme - modelling non-linear developmental progression - is
taken up and developed further in Van Geert's contribution. He tackles the no-
tion of 'Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) in the form in which it is over-
whelmingly accepted in our contemporary ('neo-Vygotskian') world - as the
'distance' between the levels of independent and socially assisted problem-sol-
ving. As we have pointed out elsewhere (Valsiner & Van der Veer 1992), this
currently popular reading of the ZPD concept constitutes a pars pro toto displace-
ment of the original focus, which was due to the historical canalization of the
appropriation of Vygotsky's ideas in North America. Nevertheless, this current-
ly widespread notion of ZPD is worth careful study and in great need of formal
clarification. Van Geert accomplishes exactly the latter - the contrast of diffe-
rent loci in the level of help (see his Figure 5) leads to an interesting scenario
which most of the 'neo-Vygotskian' almost totally ignore. Namely, as Van
Geert points out, 'sub-optimal' and 'super-optimal' help can lead to a similar re-
sult: lesser than possible competence level. In a more general sense, the 'neo-
Vygotskian' discourse in our contemporary literature seems to follow some
(self-promotional) line of educational benevolence attributed to the 'helper'
(the teacher, the expert, etc.). The 'helper' is habitually viewed as forever ready
to extend the mental horizons of the 'helped', and the possibility of intentional
suppression of some domains of competence (either by 'sub-optimal', 'super-
optimal' input, or avoidance of the input, or even purposeful misinformation) is
not usually considered (however, see Wardekker's mentioning of pupils' 'per-
spective of non-perspectivity', p. 409). Surely that 'blind area' of the ZPD-talk
is reflective of the benevolent educational aspirations of the talkers, but in our
ideological preference for that side of the 'help' we should not overlook all the
instances in our social worlds where 'help' is given to captivate the target, ra-
ther than enable him or her to gain more autonomy (and power). It would be
very interesting to see Van Geert's non-linear dynamic modelling efforts inclu-
de moments of strategic shifts in the goals of the 'helper', along the lines of va-
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rying the level of help, and its nature, in the real time unfolding of the educatio-
nal process. For example, a teacher who at time 1 works within the 'optimal
help' level to explain the new material, notices the innovation that young Pietje
Bell (who idles in his seat) has just come up with, and instead of supporting that
innovation in a helpful mode, does everything to suppress further advancement
of that in her talk with the class at time 2. In general, the educational process
(whether formal or informal) includes a coordination of helpful and non-helpful
efforts by the 'helper'.
It is exactly here that the original emphasis that Vygotsky gave to the
ZPD - the intra-individual contrast between 'already developed' and 'not yet
developed' psychological functions - helps us to get out of the clouds of im-
plied pedagogical benevolence. The child can create his own ZPD in play (and
later, in adolescence, in intra-mental fantasy), whether there is another person
immediately available or not, and whether that available 'helper' is actually
helpful, or not. This allows for redundant control over the process of develop-
ment - and for buffering of the 'help' of a non-helpful kind. The developing
child is not just a benefactor of the help from others, but an active co-construc-
tor of his own development.
The second moment of fundamental relevance introduced by Van Geert is
the issue of linkages between time scales in development. This issue has been
usually ignored by developmental psychologists, who claim to study ontogene-
tic processes while actually having evidence about some microgenetic pheno-
mena. By adding to it the sociogenetic and phylogenetic time frames, and cal-
ling for the study of dynamic links between them, Van Geert is charting out new
territory. Particularly intriguing is his recognition of the 'narrowness' of the lin-
king mechanisms (see also his Figure 10). Elaboration of the exact organization
of the narrow mechanisms, at least between the microgenetic, ontogenetic and
sociogenetic time scales, is a task that stems from Vygotsky's developmental
emphasis, but has not been developed further.
It is at this junction that probably borrowing from traditional genetics
(that was based on the unidirectional 'gene transmission' notion) may lead his
explication astray. James Mark Baldwin's idea of 'organic selection' may provi-
de a more interesting alley for further construction (see the chapter on Baldwin
in Valsiner & Van der Veer, forthcoming). It is possible that each of the levels
is involved in excessive overproduction of the 'carriers' of their messages be-
tween levels, of which only few prove to be necessary and sufficient in their
mission. Certainly that is documented for the connection of phylogenetic and
ontogenetic levels, but a similar possibility is real for other linkages. For
example, the microgenetic and ontogenetic levels may be linked by highly
constrained transfer of the inventions that the child comes up with in play to
the realm of the retained new skills at the ontogenetic level. To guarantee de-
velopment, children in play have to overproduce an endless set of different
versions of similar actions, extend the functions of objects beyond adult uses ir
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pretend play, and move quickly from one activity to another. Hence the produc-
tion of variability in children's conduct at any moment - it is not superfluous
'waste', but carries the function of necessity to guarantee that some of the ge-
nerated variability is retained ontogenetically, in some generalized form. In a
similar matter, the selectivity of the retrieval from the ontogenetic level for the
given moment of microgenesis can be viewed as always partial.
Such an understanding may provide a key to the solution of a problem
that Elbers raises. He observes that there is a fundamental ambivalence in Vy-
gotsky's work between the themes of cultural transmission and spontaneous
knowledge construction. Indeed, both Marxism and psychology have always
had difficulty with the 'principle of spontaneity', that is, a principle to account
for generativeness and creativity beyond (historical) determinism (cf. Bruner
1986, p. 78). We are sympathetic with his account of mother-child dyads co-
operating in joint problem solving, although there is probably no need, as he
says, to do away with the term 'other-regulation'. Although the child definitely
is an active partner in joint problem solving, it is the tutor who is responsible
for keeping the segments of the task to a size and complexity that the child can
manage, who demonstrates that the task is possible, who controls the focus of
attention etc. In short, such task co-operation shows two active partners who
both contribute to the task definition and solution, but in an asymmetrical way.
Although the partners solve the problem jointly, it is the adult tutor who regu-
lates the problem solving process as a whole. In doing so, he or she can be said
to provide the 'vicarious consciousness' for the child to which Wardekker
(p. 407) alludes as well.
In play things are somewhat different, of course, and Elbers' attempt to
reconcile the two strands in Vygotsky's thinking through a theory of play is
quite interesting. In fact, Elbers' interpretation of Vygotsky's thinking is more
interesting than Vygotsky's original views, who really didn't have any elaborate
theory of play at all. The few ideas he had, were borrowed from such re-
searchers as Groos, K. Bühler, and Koffka, whose general theoretical views he
vehemently rejected. However, in contradistinction to Elbers, the present au-
thors believe that a concept of imitation is central to a theory of play and, indeed,
to a theory of child development at large. Elbers argues that play allows child-
ren to transcend the boundaries of the hie et nunc, to spontaneously and uninhi-
bitedly explore the world, in short he attempts to formulate his own version of
the spontaneity principle. However, one may accept his argumentation as true
and still claim that imitation is the central mechanism of sociogenesis by defi-
ning the concept of imitation in a proper way. In Understanding Vygotsky and
elsewhere (Valsiner & Van der Veer, forthcoming) we argue that imitation ne-
cessarily implies creativity if only because a simple copying process is bound to
fail frequently and thus leads to 'mutations' of any kind. We have also argued
that it is Baldwin's largely neglected theory of persistent imitation that may pro-
vide the necessary tools for viewing imitation as a constructive process, which
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elucidates individual uniqueness as being constructed under the flow of social
suggestions.
Wardekker's criticism of our view of imitation (p. 410) also misses the
point we wished to make. The conflict between authority and authorship that he
observes seems to be another variant of the alleged contradiction between deter-
minism and spontaneity and likewise fails to see that development may be gui-
ded by the principle of 'bounded indeterminacy' as one of us has put it else-
where (Valsiner 1987; chapter 8). In Understanding Vygotsky we argued that
Vygotsky's notion of imitation was insufficient and that more sophisticated no-
tions were available at his time in the form of elaborate analyses by Guillaume
and Baldwin. Such a 'new' understanding of imitation is not narrowly focused
on adult-child interactions, but emphasizes that children actively reconstruct the
tools, scripts, and concepts their culture provides, and thereby innovate this cul-
ture.
In positing the restructuring influence of scientific concepts upon every-
day concepts Vygotsky was trying to solve a problem that had concerned many
scholars of the nineteenth century. The question was whether mastering some
specific domains of knowledge or skills would generalize to other domains and,
thus, have a facilitating influence. Unlike Herbart (cf. Geissler 1979 p 241) he
believed that such transfer was possible and the research that Shiff carried out
under his guidance was meant to corroborate this claim (see Chapter 12 of Un-
derstanding Vygotsky). His key concern was to conceive of the mind as a deve-
loping structural, systemic whole, where the transformations of some parts (e.g.
the mastering of scientific concepts) would inevitably have its repercussions for
other parts (e.g. everyday thinking). In this view there can be neither isolated
modules of mind (as some modern thinkers have it), nor static, non-dynamic
structures, and he developed his views in a continual dialogue with the seminal
Gestalt theories of Wertheimer, Köhler, and above all Koffka. It is in his
lengthy review (Vygotsky 1934) of the latter's Die Grundlagen der psychischen
Entwicklung (Koffka 1921) that Vygotsky's concern for the developing syste-
mic structure of mental functioning becomes abundantly clear. Seen from this
perspective it does not really matter whether the notion of scientific concepts is
obsolete or authoritarian. From a modern perspective a Vygotskian researcher
would probably like to investigate the possible transfer of more dynamic tools,
such as argumentation^ skills, informal logics etc. Such dynamic tools allow
the subject to come to a deeper understanding of reality without being commit-
ted to a particular view and as such they probably satisfy Wardekker's demand
for a non-authorian education for authorship. It remains to be seen, of course
whether such transfer is actually possible and neither do we wish to suggest that
Vygotsky's systemic approach solved a basic problem of developmental thin-
king. Furthermore, the exact analysis of the posited and widely discussed pro-
cesses of 'dialogue' or 'argumentation', or 'voices in the mind' - all extensions
of ideas linked with Vygotsky's emphases - needs to be undertaken. Otherwise
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our productive efforts to make sense of intra-mental psychology via an analysis
of its persistent reconstruction of the social inputs in internalization may end up
being reduced to a chorus of barely audible voices in the mind. Maybe the no-
tion of 'authorship' in the sense of a constructive agency that synthesizes novel
voices (on the basis of socially accessible ones) is a way out of the theoretical
impasse that threatens the use of polyphony metaphors in educational contexts.
As Clark and Holquist (1984, pp. 80-81) have hinted, the fundamental challenge
to any notion of authorship, including Bakhtin's, is the question concerning the
seat of control. After all, if we conceive of the human mind as a fabric of voices
or texts, a polyphony so to speak, we inevitably face the problem who is in
charge, who is the choirmaster, so to speak. Both Bakhtinian and other thinkers
have to solve this self/other distinction and must clarify how the self is con-
structed from the multitude of voices. This is a fundamental problem which we
plan to discuss in detail elsewhere (Valsiner & Van der Veer, forthcoming).
So far, we may agree with Wardekker that our response to the commenta-
tors here is indeed intertextual. It is particularly productive that the commenta-
ries pick up a number of the ideas we had discovered in Vygotsky's dialogues
with his contemporaries. Maybe this exercise calls for a new, more elaborate,
analysis of authorship. Surely our voices interact, and novelty (of scientific va-
lue) can emerge from among endless versions of ideas constructed in dialogues.
Yet the authors remain willful persons who construct their goals in these dialo-
gues, and modify those as the experience proceeds.
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